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Abstract
Innovations in Money and Banking Markets
Eduardo Guimarães Minuci
The U.S. banking industry has experienced several technological and banking regulatory changes 
in the past two decades. This dissertation is composed of three papers that review and investigate 
how these banking and technological innovations have impacted depositors, bank provision of 
monetary assets, and bank performance. The order in which the papers are presented follows the 
order in which they were produced as the production of one paper helped spark ideas that led to 
the next.
Motivated by the fact that money has become more heterogeneous in terms of its returns, Chap-
ter 1 focus on innovations in money markets by focusing on monetary assets that are used for 
payment of daily transaction in an economy, also called transaction balances. This chapter sur-
veys and critically evaluates the historical regulatory, financial, and technological innovations that 
have occurred since the 1970s that have caused the definition of U.S. transaction balances to be a 
dynamic rather than a static process. The review concludes by analyzing the potential challenges 
this research field faces ahead, with the main topic being the social welfare consequences of the 
developments of the current payment system in the United States.
Given the different types of deposit accounts banks can offer highlighted in the first chapter, 
this raises the question: do banks operating in different regions offer different deposit accounts?
Chapter 2 explores this by examining differences in the composition and behavior of West Vir-
ginia banks. The focus on WV is motivated by the relatively weak economic growth the state has 
experienced. Many factors potentially contribute to this fact, but little research has examined the 
role of financial s ervices. This paper uses micro banking data to document how WV banks differ 
from their U.S. counterparts and assess whether differences can be explained by the composition of 
banks in the state. Despite experiencing faster banking consolidation, West Virginia still has more 
and smaller banks that are less efficient and p rofitable. WV banks also have customers that favor 
lower-risk, lower-return deposits, and managers who rely heavily on lower-risk, lower-return real 
estate loans (mostly 1-4 unit residential). Other states have banks with considerable heterogeneity 
in real estate loan shares, but most of these financial outcomes are not explained well by observable 
bank and regional characteristics. Other factors are needed to explain financial heterogeneity of 
banks across states; unusually high risk aversion may explain the economically distinct banking 
strategies and low returns of WV banks.
Motivated by the findings from Chapter 2 of the presence of interesting differences in financial 
behavior of banks across U.S. states, this paper more formally quantifies them by exploring dif-
ferences in one dimension (cost efficiency) and showing where they emerge g eographically. Cost 
efficiency is explored due to its link to the ability of banks to survive and provide liquidity services 
to their clients (Assaf et al., 2019). This performance measurement is estimated at the bank-level
using a parametric cost frontier methodology, which is then aggregated at the state-level to gener-
ate performance measures for U.S. state banking markets. Given the output quality homogeneity
imposed by this methodology, this research focuses on U.S. community banks (CBs) only, which
are local U.S. banks that specialize in relationship loans. When compared to the findings from two
decades ago from Berger and Mester (1997), the bank-level results show a significant decrease in
the average cost efficiency of U.S. banks relative to the best-practice bank in that respective pe-
riod. At the state-level, a wide gap between top and poorly performing local banking markets is
found. This is a result subsequent work will continue to investigate, given that it has the potential
to partially explain differences in economic growth and labor market outcomes across U.S. states.
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Chapter 1
U.S. Transaction Balances in the New
Millennia
1.1 Introduction
Transaction balances are the sum of the stock of monetary assets that represent the total day-to-day
transactions in an economy. Before the 1970s, according to the critical literature review papers on
money demand in Table 1.1, assets used for transaction purposes were traditionally represented by
cash and demand deposits. In addition, they were also known for their important role in the formu-
lation of effective monetary policy in the United States. Nonetheless, given financial innovations
and regulatory changes experienced by the financial industry, contradicting results were reported
by different authors (from Table 1.1) on the effectiveness of measurements are useful monetary
policy parameters. As pointed out by Lucas Jr. and Nicolini (2015) and Ball (2012), however, an
explanation for these contradicting results comes from differences across studies in defining which
monetary assets serve the function of means of payment in the U.S. economy.
This review complements the literature surveys provided by Dalziel (2000) and Lagos et al.
(2017). Paul Dalziel surveys the impact of the development of practices of the banking industry
has had on monetary theory and policy, while Ricardo Lagos, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Randall
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Wright provide a critical literature review on how to explicitly model liquidity and the acceptability
of monetary assets into the exchange process of different economic agents. This paper contributes
to the literature by describing which innovations (regulatory, financial or technological) have oc-
curred since the 1970s that have caused the components of the U.S. transaction balances to change.
It is remarkable how much technology has evolved in the past five decades and, thus, not sur-
prising that these advancements have reached financial markets. Certain financial innovations,
combined with technological advances, have affected the monetary characteristics of monetary as-
sets by either allowing and improving transfers (monetary and non-monetary) between agents or
allowing more illiquid assets or new monetary assets to serve similar function of extremely liquid
ones. For instance, developments in payment methods have altered the acceptability of mone-
tary assets between sellers and buyers and, hence, increased their ability to serve the function of
medium of exchange. Furthermore, changes in the regulatory environment and emergence of new
financial instruments have altered the convenience and costs of transferring funds across different
types of deposit accounts. Thus, allowing for interest-bearing assets, such as MMDAs, to serve the
purpose of paying for daily transactions.
The definition of transaction balances is a dynamic rather than a static process. Monetary assets
used to make day-to-day payments have changed over time due to changes in regulations and
financial/technological innovations. Given that these developments tend to have an asymmetric
impact on the liquidity characteristics of different monetary assets, they require individuals to
reevaluate their wealth portfolio allocation. When aggregated over time, changes in individuals’
portfolio allocation of wealth may require a reassessment of which monetary assets should be
considered when defining the main types of money being used for transactions in the economy.
Thus, this review also highlights the need to update the variable used to identify monetary assets
used for transaction purposes in models that include money, such as money-in-utility (MIU), cash-
in-advance (CIA), and New Monetarist Economics (NME).
This review adds to the strain of literature on money and payment methods by critically eval-
uating which and how technological, financial, or regulatory innovations in the past five decades
2
have altered the definition of transaction balances in the U.S. economy today. The content of this
paper addresses the shortcomings of the literature in defining money used for day-to-day transac-
tions, which have arisen from the inability of the components included in the U.S. monetary base
to catch up to the pace of technological innovations in financial markets. This review concludes by
analyzing the potential challenges this research field faces ahead. The main topics being the social
welfare consequences of the developments of the current payment system in the US.
The following section of this review covers the definition of money and transaction balances.
Moreover, it also covers the evolution from commodity to fiat money in the United States and
explains how monetary aggregates are not able to define transaction balances in the United States
anymore. Section 3 explores the regulatory changes which allowed new types of money to emerge
and the impact of these developments on the asset portfolio allocation in the US. Section 4 focus on
the technological and financial innovations that altered the acceptability and medium of exchange
function of traditionally illiquid types of money. Section 5 discusses future important topics for
research in this field, and section 6 concludes.
1.2 Money and Transaction Balances in the United States
Since transaction balances are a subcategory of money and liquidity, it is important to define these
terms. This sections begins exploring the definition of money and ends discussing liquidity.
As introductory economics classes teach, money is an asset that serves three main functions:
medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value. Its most important characteristic is to
facilitate the exchange process among economic agents (Lagos et al., 2017). As highlighted by
Tobin (1992), money facilitates trade and, hence, allows individuals to achieve a higher standard
of living. This can be illustrated by the traditional double coincidence of wants problem, which
can be improved when a commonly adopted medium of exchange is introduced. This review will
specifically focus on monies which main function is to serve as a medium of exchange for day-to-
day expenses in the US.
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The monetary assets that have served the function of money in the U.S. economy have changed
over time. Commodity money was the earliest type of money that emerged in the United States
used for day-to-day transactions (Lagos et al., 2017). One of the drawbacks of commodity money
is that its value is derived from the intrinsic value of the underlying commodity composing it (e.g.,
gold, silver, and other precious metals) making it costly to produce and susceptible to large fluctu-
ations in supply or demand. In addition, given that the supply of commodity money is dependent
on the quantity of its underlying commodity, this type of money limits the monetary authority of a
central bank over determining the quantity of money in circulation in the economy.
During the Great Depression the drawbacks of commodity money became evident resulting
in the emergence of fiat money. This took place when Congress, in 1933, declared all coin and
currency issued by the Federal Reserve to be a legal tender in the US. Hence, over the next five
decades, the value of the U.S. dollars transitioned from being tied to the value of gold to simply
being tied to the belief of market participants on the ability of the U.S. dollar money to maintain its
purchasing power in the near future. Thus, the economy slowly transitioned from using commod-
ity to fiat money, a type of medium of exchange which is intrinsically useless and inconvertible
(Wallace, 2018).
Different from value origination, distinguishing money based on its form does not limit the
ability of an asset to serve for transaction purposes. For instance, in terms of form, U.S. transaction
balances are composed of both physical and electronic monetary assets. Physical money has the
main four functions of money and can be physically held by its possessor. On the other hand,
electronic money (also called virtual money or e-money) also possesses these four functions, but
it exists only virtually. Electronic money can be either be sovereign or privately issued.
Private e-monies are issued by private companies, which is different from sovereign money
since its created by a central bank. The acceptability and relevance of private monies is exacerbated
for less developed economies due to the lack of trust of its economic agents in the ability of the
country’s sovereign currency to hold maintain value over time, which leads them to opt for the
use of a relatively more stable private currency. For instance, Jack et al. (2010) and Ahmad et al.
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(2020) report the emergence of MPESA, a private money, as the dominantly used currency in
Kenya. Given the lack of data on the share of U.S. transactions that use cryptocurrencies as a
medium of exchange and the share of U.S. sellers which accept them as a method of payment,
this is an area of study future research must address. In the past, the definition of transaction
balances in the United States was linked to the definition of U.S. monetary aggregates. Walter
(1989) provides explanations to the origin and evolution of monetary aggregates in the US. In
1944, the Federal Reserve began published information on the total stock of money called M1,
with the intent to provide information to the U.S. private sector on the total supply of money in
the economy. Traditionally, M1 was representative of the total U.S. transaction balances since it is
composed of noninterest-bearing monetary assets (such currency,1 demand deposits at commercial
banks, and traveler’s checks) and interest-bearing accounts which do not impose restrictions on
depositors on the number transactions they are allowed to do in a given time period (such as NOW
accounts). Nonetheless, over time monetary assets not included in M1 began to gain the ability to
also serve transaction purposes.
In addition to M1, the Federal Reserve also began publishing data on a monetary aggregate
called M2 in 1971 (Walter, 1989).2 This new monetary aggregate arose especially due to the
growing importance for monetary policy analysis of less liquid monetary assets that served the
function of store of value in the United States (Adrian and Shin, 2009). M2 is defined by the sum
of M1, savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts), and small-denomination time
deposits, with some exceptions. M2 components not in M1 include were traditionally relatively
less liquid but offered higher returns, thus, serving well the function of store of value of money.
Over time, however, developments in payment methods and technology have altered liquidity and
acceptability characteristics of some of these monetary assets. This study contributes to the lit-
erature on money and payment methods by reviewing what has changed in the past five decades
1Currency here refers to currency that is specifically outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and the
vaults of depository institutions.
2The Federal Reserve also publishes data on additional monetary aggregates such as M3 and M4; however, given
the focus of this review on transaction balances, only the two narrowest U.S. monetary aggregates, M1 and M2, are
discussed in this review.
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that has led M1 to not fully capture total transaction balances in the U.S. economy as it did in the
1970s.
To determine which monetary assets should be considered part of the U.S. transaction balances
this paper uses a benchmark based on how close of a substitute a monetary asset is to cash and
demand deposits. This seems like a feasible benchmark given that these assets have been the most
used type of monies for transaction purposes in the United States according to data from the Survey
of Consumer Payments Choice (Foster et al., 2020). Two important dimensions of comparison in
this benchmark are (1) its acceptability among buyers and sellers as method of payment, and (2)
the liquidity characteristics of a monetary asset. Acceptability will be further discussed in section 4
with the development of new payment methods. The remaining of this section focus on describing
liquidity and its importance in the wealth portfolio allocation of depositors.
Lagos et al. (2017) and Burdett et al. (2017), by modeling the exchange process across eco-
nomic agents explicitly, show that the monetary characteristics of an asset are dimensions neces-
sary to evaluate the comparability of different monetary instruments. They define liquidity to be
an essential parameter for this analysis. Liquidity describes how easy an asset can be converted
into cash and therefore has a direct effect on the ability of monetary assets to serve as the source of
funds for daily transactions (Greenbaum et al., 2019). Demand deposits and currency are the most
liquid types of money in the United States since they can be instantly converted into cash at par.
The incentive to hold relatively illiquid monetary assets comes from their ability to generate
positive returns over time. A trade-off is usually observed between the return on a monetary asset
and its liquidity characteristics. To earn higher returns, banks impose certain requirements that
reduce the easiness (the speed) of converting such assets into cash. If the requirements set by the
bank over an account are broken, a fee or loss in interest earned is levied. For instance, savings
accounts and Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDAs), which are offered by banks, tend to
limit depositors to a maximum of six transactions per month before facing a penalty fee for mov-
ing funds “in excess.” Other requirements faced by depositors holding these more illiquid types of
accounts include a minimum balance necessary to the keep in the account, and the requirement of
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providing the bank with at least a week (or 30 days) pre-notice prior to withdrawing a significant
amount of funds from the account. It is important to highlight that these types of monies are very
heterogeneous across different banks despite having similar names; thus, restrictions vary across
accounts and banks. Table 1.2 lists the main monetary assets in circulation which are used for trans-
action purposes in the U.S. economy. Moreover, the table also reports information which monetary
aggregate each asset belongs to, and what restrictions explain their imperfect substitutability with
cash. For a list of all monetary assets in the U.S. economy, including monetary assets not used for
transactions, please refer to Barnett et al. (1992).
1.3 The Impact of Regulations
One of the time-variant parameters that have impacted what we define as money in circulation in
the United States is the institutional environment faced by the banking industry. For instance, over
the past five decades there have been several major policy changes, which led and allowed financial
institutions to grow and develop new monetary assets for its customers. Hence, these regulatory
changes deserve special attention since they either directly or indirectly have impacted the creation
and the ability of different monetary assets to function as a medium of exchange and to store value
over time.
The impact that policy has on defining what is the commonly accepted money in an economy
is not an innovation of the current economic system. In the early 1700s in England, the master of
the mint unintentionally enabled a policy which pushed the gold to new highs, forcing silver coins
out of circulation, and lead the British to the gold standard (Tobin, 1992). Nonetheless, the more
recent impact of regulations on the U.S. monetary base has been slower and less emphasized by
policymakers. For instance, the first policy with major impact on U.S. monetary assets was the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Sherman, 2009). This
act signed by President Jimmy Carter called for a phase-out of interest rate ceilings on deposit
accounts, which was done over a period of six years. Prior to 1980, savings accounts interest rates
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were capped by law, hence most investors had to search for alternative investment opportunities
in the market. This act allowed banks to offer higher returns on savings accounts, which aimed to
incentivize savings in the economy and altered the store of value characteristics of interest-bearing
bank deposit accounts.
This deregulatory pressure which started with the stagflation period experienced in the late
1970s also led to the creation of new monetary assets. To reduce the opportunity cost of holding
cash under a period of high interest rates, President Reagan signed the Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act in 1982. This regulatory change allowed commercial banks and thrifts
to create and offer Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDAs) and NOW accounts to its clients.
These are deposit accounts, which insured by the FDIC, pay a “money market” rate making them
competitive with other investment opportunities such as treasury bills. Despite the higher return,
these accounts have restrictions on depositor withdrawal activity that are stricter than the ones
imposed by traditional savings accounts. Furthermore, this regulation also allowed bank holding
companies to offer discounts on brokerage services, which allowed customers to more easily shift
funds from money to money like (less liquid monetary asset) instruments.
Now that banks were allowed to further develop interest-bearing deposit accounts, they only
needed opportunities to grow. These opportunities came with the Fed decisions related to Section
20 Subsidiaries in 1987, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
the reinterpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1996, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
These polices not only impacted the average size of banks and the competition they faced in the
markets they operated, but also their ability to financially innovate (Frame and White, 2004).
Hannan and McDowell (1984, 1987) using the conditional probability of a bank adopting au-
tomated teller machines (ATM) as a proxy for a bank’s financial innovation, show that bank size,
bank holding company affiliation, bank product mix, and local competition (whether rival bank
in area has adopted ATM) influence the development/adoption of new technologies. Hence, reg-
ulatory changes that incentivize/allow banks to grow and expand are positively indirectly linked
with the ability of banks to financially innovate. Given that these innovations have asymmetrically
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altered the liquidity characteristics of monetary assets and their ability to serve as a direct medium
of exchange to depositors, they have consequently impacted the main types of monetary assets in
circulation in the U.S. economy.
So the question is how did these regulatory changes allowed banks to grow faster? The Fed
decisions in 1987, for instance, allowed BHCs to start underwriting corporate and other non-
government securities for banks. This policy affected both the size of security markets and the
ability of banks to diversify their investments and grow. Moreover, the Riegle-Neal Act eliminated
previous restrictions on interstate banking and branching allowing banks to expand geographi-
cally. This regulatory change led to a change in the market composition of the banking industry
since markets now faced the presence of both large multi-market3 banks and smaller single-market
banks. The reinterpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act also deserve attention since they enabled
banks to provide investment services and attract more depositors. These began in 1996 and ended
with the complete phase-out of this Act in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Lastly, there was the repeal of the Regulation Q in 2011. Regulation Q was a Federal Reserve
Board rule that prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposits. The Regulation Q was
passed with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 with the goal to decrease loan sharking, consequently
reducing bank risk, and to motivate consumers to move funds into money market funds. Regulation
Q was repealed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
which removed remaining restrictions on banks offering interest on demand deposits; nonetheless,
it still kept restrictions on number of transfers depositors are allowed to have per month in their
interest-bearing accounts. This policy intended to control credit illiquidity and promote an increase
in reserves. One of its outcomes, however, was an increase in the ability of some of the most liquid
U.S. monetary assets to better function as a store of value.
The regulatory changes highlighted in this section made banks to be more likely to innovate and
altered both the medium of exchange and store of value characteristics of different monetary assets.
They impacted both the ability of banks and financial institutions to create new monetary assets
3Multi-market here refers to a bank which operates in more than one state.
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and make their liquid assets available as a direct medium of exchange through the developments
of new payment methods and mobile banking platforms. As stated by Humphrey et al. (2001), the
larger variety of monetary instruments allow investors to better allocate their financial resources
and, thus, potentially achieve higher utility levels.
The following section of this paper will further define and describe the financial innovations
that marked this period. Moreover, it will also summarize the most recent empirical results on the
U.S. consumer payment choices which are directly linked to the definition of the components of
the U.S. monetary base elaborated in this study.
1.4 Financial Innovations in the Past 50 Years
In this paper the term financial innovation “represents something new that reduces costs, reduces
risks, or provides an improved product/service/instrument that better satisfies participants’ [bank
customers’] demands” (Frame and White, 2004). The first financial innovation which deserves at-
tention since the 1970s is the development of automated teller machines (ATMs). This innovation
reduced the cost of production for financial institutions over time (Humphrey et al., 2001) and,
similar to checks, incentivized individuals to hold less cash in their wallets (Berger, 2003). De-
positors now faced lower transaction costs to withdraw money from their deposit accounts since
the availability of ATMs increased the likelihood of one being near his/her bank branch or an
ATM machine when needing to withdraw money (Frame and White, 2004). This innovation was
extremely important before the 2000s when debit cards were not commonly accepted by sellers.
Nonetheless, as technology evolved in the United States over time and banking and seller payment
systems became more dependent on computers, this environment did not last long.
The most relevant technological innovations were the development of the Internet in the early
2000s and the development of the electronics such as computers and mobile phones. Both had a
huge impact in the convenience of using different payment methods for consumers. For instance,
the Internet fueled globalization which increased communication and increased labor productivity
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generating more opportunities to firms, including technological and financial, to research and inno-
vate. Moreover, the Internet and computerization of the banking industry increased the provision
of internet services (electronic bill payment), direct deposit options, and an increase in the speed
of transfers of money (Berger, 2003). Other types of electronic transactions that already existed
include FedWire and Automated Clearing House services. However, the Internet significantly low-
ered the costs of transaction related to using such services. Hence, as computers and cell phones
became more accessible and sophisticated, financial innovation led to the emergence of mobile
banking services.4
The development of mobile banking services was extremely important since it increased the
convenience for depositors to manage their funds and transfer money across their own accounts,
which could now be done remotely. In addition, they also facilitated/incentivized investment and
savings by lowering the cost of gathering information and creating platforms where investors could
choose from different investment tools from the comfort of their homes (Ouma et al., 2017). Com-
bined with a regulatory environment that allowed banks to grow and expand, these technological
innovations led financial institutions to develop new payment methods to attract more depositors
and aim to reduce banks’ expenses. Recently, the Fed has been working on creating a faster
payments system called FedNow for retail payments that is essentially instantaneous (within day
clearing and settlement).5
The development of new payment methods can have a similar impact on the wealth portfolio
allocation of individuals if the new payment methods lead to a reallocation of funds across dif-
ferent deposit accounts. This is due to the effects these innovations have on the convenience and
incentives/costs for consumers and sellers to use different forms of funds to pay for daily transac-
tions, which as highlighted by Schuh and Stavins (2010) are the most important determinants of
payment use.
4Other technological developments similar to mobile banking include Venmo, Zelle, Cash App, among other
platforms. Nonetheless, these platforms are not technically allowed to be used for transactions, only transfer of funds
among different individuals; hence, since it does not alter the money in circulation in the United States it will not be a
focus of this study.
5For more info on FedNow please refer to https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
other20190805a.htm
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It is important to properly distinguish between monies and payment methods (Tobin, 1992),
which is a concept some economists do not recognize yet. Fujiki and Tanaka (2009) and Singh
(1999, 2004), for instance, consider ATM payments and Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of
Sale (EFTPOS), such as debit cards, as money. They do not recognize that both are instruments to
access an agent’s checkable deposit account and should be considered a form of electronic payment
method, instead. Other forms of payment methods that can be confused with types of money are
checks, money orders, online banking bill pay, and credit cards.6 The distinction between money
and payment methods is important since technological innovations can affect them differently.
The most important payment methods used by consumers in the past decades are cash pay-
ments, checks, debit cards, and credit cards (Schuh and Stavins, 2010). Nonetheless, debit and
credit cards have gained a considerable share of the market for payment methods in the most re-
cent decade as shown by the report provided by Foster et al. (2020). These authors provide a
summary of consumer behavior based on data from the Survey of Consumer and Payment Meth-
ods. Ching and Hayashi (2010), Simon et al. (2010), Carbó-Valverde and Liñares-Zegarra (2011),
Arango et al. (2015), and David et al. (2016) show that once card payments are generally accepted
by sellers, there is a general negative impact of consumer debit and credit cards usage on the
demand for cash.
The benefit of the use of debit cards come from an increase in security over one’s deposits,
which comes from one not necessarily having to carry large amounts of cash for daily purchases.
Both debit and credit cards also provide a certain level of security by requiring cardholders to enter
their PIN number (password) or sign a proof of receipt when a transaction is placed using such
payment method. In addition, both debit and credit cards facilitate the ability of buyers and sellers
to engage in non-in-person (online or mobile) transactions. Thus, the online shopping market
(ecommerce) deserves attention in this study given the fast recent growth this market in the past
10 years, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau in the quarterly retail e-commerce sales of 2020.7
Online payment methods dominate the transactions on ecommerce due to a certain “oligopoly”
6Credit cards deserve special attention given that they are forms of debt (Schuh and Stavins, 2010).
7All U.S. Census retail e-commerce reports can be found at http://www.census.gov/retail.
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they have over such market. This is because the alternative payment method would be to send
a cash or check through the mail, which does not provide the same level of security to neither
borrowers nor sellers.
Nonetheless, online payment instruments also gained importance on in-person transactions due
to the price incentives offered specially to credit cardholders. Banks have incentivized individuals
to use electronic types of payments since they often cost only a third to one-half of the cost of paper-
based transactions (Humphrey et al., 2001). Thus, this increase in acceptance of these payment
methods by sellers are a result of both nonprice and price incentives offered by banks, such as
convenience and marketing for sellers,8 and cash back rewards for consumers Arango et al. (2015).
Credit cards are a type of payment used by consumers which has gained popularity given
opportunity monetary “rewards” they provide and the emergence of mobile transfer platforms.
The technological and financial innovations experienced by the banking industry also generated
technologies which facilitated the exchange of information between borrowers and sellers. For
instance, “information exchange” were created, which “are intermediaries through which banks
and other creditors share data relevant to the creditworthiness of loan applicants” (Berger, 2003).
These informational exchange innovations helped fuel the growth of the credit card loan industry,
which to attract more customers began offering rewards and incentives for customers who adopted
such payment methods (Schuh et al., 2013).
Nonetheless, not all credit cardholders have the ability to take advantage of these rewards since
the access to these services depends on one’s credit ratings and financial information. Assuming
one is approved to get a credit line that can earn rewards, as one uses their credit card to pay for
daily expenses one would earn cash back, airfair miles, travel rewards, among others.9 The overall
monetary compensation received by each cardholder is then based on the type of the credit line
and the type, number, and magnitude of the transactions placed by the cardholder during a billing
8“Nonprice attributes are very important and concern increasing the availability of credit and debit card terminals
at the point of sale, expanding the number of firms that can accept electronic bill payments, convincing employees to
have their wages deposited electronically, and establishing dispute resolution policies for preauthorized direct debits
to compensate for loss of user control over when a debit occurs” (Humphrey et al., 2001).




These credit card price incentives altered the customer cost of using credit cards for daily
transactions, but, more importantly, they gave consumers the option to increase the returns on
their deposits. Traditionally, due to the instant loss of funds upon the purchase of a good/service
and the withdraw restrictions imposed on savings accounts, individuals generally allocated a cer-
tain amount of their wealth towards extremely liquid (M1) monies for daily purchases. Nonethe-
less, different from debit cardholders, credit cardholders do not instantly lose access to funds in
their personal banking accounts once they engage in a transaction, rather customers are billed
monthly by their credit card company. Hence, this has allowed depositors to reallocate part of their
noninterest-bearing monetary assets towards interest-bearing assets, since theoretically consumers
would only need to transfer money from less liquid accounts once per month to pay for their credit
card bill.
Consumers could, thus, not only take advantage of the credit card rewards based on their expen-
ditures but could also take advantage of the interest-bearing products (MMDAs and other savings
accounts) offered by banks. Combined with innovations in forms of direct payment from non-
traditional types of money,10 this reallocation of more liquid (M1) to less liquid (M2) type of
accounts helps explain why the definition of the U.S. transaction balances has become blurry in
recent decades. M1 funds do not represent the total money in circulation anymore since customers
may be storing funds being used for daily expenses on M2 deposits. Nonetheless, considering
total M2 (which includes M1) does not seem appropriate since not all M2 funds are used for daily
transactions as highlighted by literature papers in Table 1.1.
New monetary assets and new payment methods are part of the technological innovations that
have altered the incentives towards using different monetary assets for transaction purposes in the
United States. This is due to financial innovations being continuous, which translates to continuous
changes in the incentives behind the two-sided nature of retail payment systems in the United States
over time. This section summarized what and how technological and financial innovations in the
10An example of non-traditional types of money include MMDAs and home equity lines of credit (HELOC), which
have checks and/or debit cards that can be used to make payments.
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past five decades have altered the liquidity and acceptability of different monetary instruments
leading to changes in the types of monetary assets for daily transactions in the U.S. economy.
1.5 What’s Ahead?
This survey highlights the need of future research to consider the impact that financial and tech-
nological innovations have had on money and its characteristics when evaluating the stability of
money velocity in the United States. This is because to properly calculate the velocity of money in
an economy, one must properly define total money in circulation being used for transactions.
Furthermore, future research should continue to explore the unclear long-run social welfare
consequences of these innovations. For instance, the opportunity to take advantage of these tech-
nological innovations tend to be more available to individuals who have a higher level of education
attainment and income, are older, and who live in more concentrated areas (Frame and White,
2004; Schuh et al., 2013). One of the reasons for this fact is the existence of minimum restrictions
necessary to qualify for certain higher interest-earning deposit accounts, which reduce access of
low-income earners to such savings tools. These restrictions include potential annual fees, mini-
mum balance required for the account and/or to open one, limit on number of monthly transactions,
overdraft fees, and pre-notice of withdrawal of funds by the depositor, which are specified for each
monetary asset of M2 described in Table 1.2.
Humphrey et al. (2001) and Schuh et al. (2013) also warn how this new payment system in-
volving debit and credit cards also induces a regressive transfer from low-income to high-income
households. For instance, financial institutions charge sellers fees every time a debit or credit card
transaction is performed, which leads retailer to merge such expense “into the overhead compo-
nent of the prices he[/she] charges” (Humphrey et al., 2001). Given that sellers tend to not price
discriminate based on payment method, consumers spending with cash (generally lower-income
earners) end up paying more for goods/services, while credit card spenders are cross-subsidized
by them through their “rewards” program.
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Since these payment methods do not seem to be going away anytime soon, it is essential that
future research continue to evaluate concerns regarding whether these new financial innovations are
imposing a regressive transfer of wealth from lower- to higher-income earners. The implications
of the asymmetric impact of these banking industry innovations across individuals of different
socioeconomic classes are of even greater relevance to less developed countries as highlighted by
Demombynes and Thegeya (2012).
1.6 Conclusion
The content of this paper addresses the shortcomings of the literature in defining transaction bal-
ances for the U.S. economy by surveying and critically evaluating the financial and technological
innovations that have caused the components of U.S. transaction balances to not be static over time.
The survey contributes to the literature by emphasizing that since these innovations are continuous,
so should be the process of defining the composition of U.S. transaction balances. In addition, it
highlights the importance of understanding how these innovations impact the liquidity and accept-
ability of different monetary assets. Furthermore, given that most empirical papers on this topic
use data from the 2000s, the relevance of this topic is very likely to grow since future studies that
include recent data are expected to find results that further strengthen the implications discussed in
this survey.
A policy implication this paper derives, which does not dive into the social welfare conse-
quences discussed in the section above, is the potential benefit of further investing on improving
and expanding the frequency of data collection of the Survey of Consumer and Payment Choices,
which is conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Improvements in data collection
would not only improve the ability of regulators and researchers to properly estimate US transac-
tion balances and money velocity, but also allow for a better investigation of short- and long-run
social welfare consequences of the financial and regulatory innovations the economy experience.
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Table 1.1: Money Demand Literature Papers
Authors: Topic Covered:
Judd and Scadding (1982)
Analyzes the episode of “Missing Money” in the 1970s. It also
discusses factors that can shift money demand, which could
have potentially caused money demand to become unstable.
Leventakis and Brissimis (1991)
Discusses “Missing Money” and “The Great Velocity Decline”
episodes of the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. It extends
Judd and Scadding (1982) by including a larger data set and
for considering international factors that can shift money demand
and could have contributed to the money demand instability
empirical findings.
Barnett et al. (1992)
Surveys the importance of the use of nonlinear economic theory
in modeling the demand for money. The paper also focuses “on
highlighting that the simple-sum index should be abandoned both
as a source of research data and as an intermediate target or
indicator for monetary policy.”
Arestis and Mihailov (2011)
Reviews the entire modern money demand era.a They provide a
structured classification of different field of studies of Monetary
Economics and qualifying money demand studies as monetary
theory.b The classification of these sub-fields is based on the main
issues of inquiry and key techniques used.
Le Maux (2014)
Investigates the foundation of both classical and quantity theories
of money. This research mainly focusses on pre-modern era studies
and differences between Cantillon’s and Hume’s views on monetary
theory and policy. Cantillon is referred to as one of the originators
of the classical view, while Hume is argued to originate the quantity
theory view.
Lagos et al. (2017)
The survey of the post-modern era which defines liquidity and its
importance. It does not focus its discussion on money demand
stability; rather, they survey how to explicitly model liquidity into
the exchange process of different economic agents.
Note: Knell and Stix (2005) also belong to this group. Nonetheless, this research paper does not focus on the
critically analyzing their findings.
a In this case, the modern era refers to the time range from the post Great Depression period to the end of the
20th century.
b Other general classifications are called Monetary Policy and Public Finance.
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Restrictions that make it
less comparable to cash .
What changed over these
past 50 years?
Cash M1 NA
Has been less used due to
emergence of new payment
methods and financial
innovations which allowed
individuals to better store
the value of their wealth
over time. It still




As other types of US sovereign electronic
monies, these funds do not allow for
consumer privacy. However, they provide
higher security of funds due to the FDIC
deposit insurance program. Since 2011,
some of these accounts started to offer
positive returns, but they may require
cardholder to pay an annual fee.
Has been less used due to
emergence of new payment
methods and financial
innovations which allowed
individuals to better store
the value of their wealth
over time. It still represents




Safer than cash since it requires a
signature of the consumer upon purchase
of a good/service.
High transaction costs
relative to other monetary




of the banking industry.
NOW Accounts M1
NOW accounts stands for “negotiable
order of withdrawal.” They do not limit
account holders on the number of
transactions and transfers of funds per
month. These accounts are interest-
bearing assets with lower returns than
savings accounts and MMDAs. But,
they do impose restrictions on the
account minimum balance required
and can potentially require a minimum
deposit to open the account.
The emergence of mobile
banking and the higher
usage of credit cards
as payment methods
increased the ability of
individuals to allocate
share of their transaction
(very liquid) deposits
towards interest-bearing
less liquids types of
money such as NOW
accounts.
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Restrictions that make it
less comparable to cash .
What changed over these
past 50 years?
ATS M1
Competitive with NOW accounts.
It has lost market to NOW accounts.
The emergence of mobile
banking and the higher
usage of credit cards as
payment methods increased
the ability of individuals to








Traditionally, they offer lower returns
than both MMDAs and NOW accounts.
This type of accounts does not always
require a minimum balance, but when
it does, it tends to be low (usually less
than $500). Savings accounts are very
heterogeneous. Some banks also offer
special high-yield savings accounts,
but these accounts generally include a
high minimum deposit (thousands of
dollars) and higher minimum balance
requirements than even MMDAs.
The emergence of mobile
banking and the higher
usage of credit cards as
payment methods
increased the ability of
individuals to allocate
share of their transaction
(very liquid) deposits
towards interest-bearing
less liquids types of
money such as savings
accounts.
MMDAs M2
MMDAs can offer relatively high
interest rates since banks can
invest these funds in certificates of
deposit (CDs), government securities
and commercial paper, which low-
yield savings and NOW accounts
cannot do. However, they impose
higher restrictions related to a
minimum balance required in
the account. Federal Reserve
Regulation D limits MMDA account
holders to six monthly transfers
and/or electronic payments out of
the funds of their accounts.
The emergence of mobile
banking and the higher
usage of credit cards as
payment methods
increased the ability of
individuals to allocate
share of their transaction
(very liquid) deposits
towards interest-bearing
less liquids types of






Not commonly accepted by sellers.
Not issued by the Federal Reserve,
Mobile banking, lack of
stability of sovereign
currencies, and lack of
trust in central banks
around the world have
incentivized the development




How Are West Virginia Banks Different?
Co-authored with Scott Schuh.
2.1 Introduction
Even before the 2016 presidential election, the economic challenges facing Appalachia, and specif-
ically West Virginia, during recent decades were well known (McCarthy, 2014; Stephens et al.,
2013). Table 2.1 illustrates some the challenges by comparing summary statistics for West Vir-
ginia (WV) and the United States (US). In 2017, West Virginia’s population ranked 39th in the
nation at 1.8 million (0.5 percent of total population), was shrinking (−2.0 versus 3.2 percent for
five years), and had a relatively high proportion of residents ages 65 and older. Real per-capita
income in West Virginia was $41,600, 16 percent lower than the rest of the nation, and the median
WV home price ($112,000)—a key part of household wealth—was 42 percent below other U.S.
homes. The unemployment rate (5.2 percent) was one full percentage point above other states, and
the labor-force participation rate was 53.3 percent—10.5 percentage points below the rest of the
nation. Nevertheless, WV boasted an 11 percentage point higher rate of home ownership at 75.1
percent.1
Recognition of economic malaise in West Virginia and Appalchia is widely document from
1The qualitative nature of this WV-US economic comparison is essentially the same for several years before and
after 2017.
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newspaper headlines (Badger, 2021) to scholarly research (Isserman and Rephann, 1995; Lewis
and Billings, 1997; Herath et al., 2013; Appalachian Regional Commission, 2015). There are
many diverse and important factors contributing to weak economic growth. Stephens and Deskins
(2018) and Stephens and Partridge (2011), for instance, report, respectively, that the labor force
participation and entrepreneurship activity are factors that can partially explain the relatively poor
economic performance of WV and the Appalachian region. Other concerns cited are the decline
in coal mining, high rates of disability in the workforce, poor education, and opiod or other drug
addictions. However, little research has examined the role of financial markets in the economic
growth of this area.
This paper investigates whether the nature of state-level banking, the most basic element of
financial services, might help explain economic outcomes in the Appalachian region. As a first
step, we ask and answer the question: how are WV banks different from those in the rest of the
United States? Although banking challenges are unlikely to be responsible for all or most of the
poor economic performance of the region, there are good reasons to suspect that banking is an
important factor in economic growth (see Danisewicz et al. (2018), Zingales (2015), Berger and
Black (2020), Berger et al. (2020), Brown et al. (2019), Khan and Ozel (2016), Nguyen (2019),
Berger and Sedunov (2017), among others). Thus, differences between WV banks and those in
regions with stronger economic growth may reveal areas where WV banks might be able to adopt
reforms and innovations that would increase the contribution of the banking sector to economic
growth.
Our research strategy is three-fold. First, we define and classify WV banks and their market,
comparing and contrasting them with other banks and markets. Second, we use financial statements
to measure and characterize differences in the business strategies of individual banks in WV versus
the rest of the nation. Third, we use regression analysis to control for observable characteristics
of banks and states and test whether differences in the composition of bank types across states
can explain the differences in business strategies of WV and other states’ banks. In all of these
analyses, we use standard bank-level data from the Reports of Condition and Income, or Call
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Reports (CR), and Summary of Deposits (SOD) for 2017 to focus on cross-section differences,
leaving time series analysis for future research.
We find that the WV banking market is broadly similar to that in other states except for the
number and size of banks (and branches). In all states, the number of banks has been declining and
the average size of banks increasing due to the emergence of interstate banking and technological
advances that encourage economies of scale and favor mergers and acquisitions, consolidation,
and reduced reliances on branches. In West Virginia, this trend has been similar to, but faster than,
the rest of the nation. Also, WV has more and smaller banks (and branches) per capita, which
may reflect production or cost inefficiencies. However, the WV banking market does not appear to
exhibit materially less competition than the rest of the nation.
We also construct financial statements for banks and find that WV banks exhibit interesting
differences in their business strategies from other U.S. banks. In terms of sources of funds, WV
banks have a different mix of interest expenses stemming from differences in bank account hold-
ings (liabilities). Interest expenses for WV banks are higher for transaction accounts and for time
deposits, but lower for savings accounts, especially money market deposit accounts with higher
returns (and risk). In terms of uses of funds, WV bank managers hold notably less diversified and
lower risk portfolios of assets. Specifically, WV banks hold 56 percent of their assets in real estate
loans, roughly twice as much as other U.S. banks. Naturally, this strategy leads to a greater flow
of income from real estate interest. WV banks also generate different proportions of non-interest
income: the sale of assets accounts for three times as much income (24 percent), with lower pro-
portions in most other categories. A bank’s revenue composition deserves attention since it has
been shown to be important in predicting bank failures (Berger et al. (2016), Williams (2016)).
Together, these findings suggest that characteristics such as risk aversion could differentiate WV
banks.
Our regression analysis examines the extent to which heterogeneity in individual bank char-
acterstics and state-level economic variables can explain observed differences in the financial be-
havior of banks across states. In a standard estimated fixed-effects model, differences between
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WV and other U.S. banks remain statistically and economically significant despite controls for
bank heterogeneity. We then broaden the analysis to include individual effects for all states and
estimate a two-level mixed-effects model of real estate loans with state-level real GDP per capita
and population growth. Although state-level variables improve model fit, neither they nor the bank
characteristics can explain the broad heterogeneity in real estate loan shares of banks across states.
The results reveal that financial intermediation differs regionally not because states have dif-
ferent types of banks but because states have banks that make different economic and financial
decisions from those in other states. Explaining why banks in one state might hold a much higher
share of real estate loans in its asset portfolio than banks in another state is beyond the scope
of this paper. To explain cross-state difference in financial intermediation it will be necessary to
build and estimate profit-maximizing models of financial intermediation. Based on the evidence
reported here, those models need to capture investment decisions that lead to heteroegeneous asset
portfolios and competition for deposits that leads to heterogeneous sources of funds.
2.2 Literature Review
This study adds to the the strain of literature which studies geographic components of the U.S.
banking industry. Most research papers in this literature have focused on studying the geography
of the banking industry and on how distance to lenders have impacted the behavior of banks over
time. These changes in geographical components are a product of a combination of technological
advancements, deregulation, and consolidation of the U.S. banking industry. Alessandrini et al.
(2009) presents a great summary of the literature on this topic. Moreover, Radecki (1998) deserves
special attention since it studies what is the best geographic measurement that in general can define
a bank’s market. He defines state borders to be the best approximation to “the true marketplace
for banking services.” Nguyen (2019) reports a localized and persistent negative effect on small
business loan originations from local bank branch closures, which highlights the importance of
proximity and market composition. Other studies such as Goetz et al. (2016) focus on the geo-
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graphic expansions of bank holding companies. Nonetheless, our study fits in a smaller niche of
this literature, which has a lot of room to grow.
This research focuses on how banks in different geographic regions might differ from banks in
other regions, more specifically West Virginia. Investigating differences across regional banking
industries can help us better understand the real impact of the banking industry across different
regions in the US. The closest study to ours is from Barth et al. (2016) who compare and contrast
banks in Alabama. Other studies such as Tokle and Tokle (2000) and Hannan (1979) focuses
on studying the competition in the banking industries of Idaho and Montana, and Pennsylvania,
respectively. However, only Barth et al. (2016) compare the studied regional banking industry to
the remaining of the US.
Barth et al. (2016) also focus on a state, Alabama, which has faced slower economic growth
relative to other states. They find that the Alabama banks’ returns (ROA) are lower than most
U.S. banks, ranked 40th in 2015. In addition, their study explored the impact of the regional
banking industry on the real regional economy through a county-level correlation analysis. The
study finds that the higher bank loans in a country, higher the county income. In addition, a positive
correlation is found between county average weekly wages and both county bank loans and county
bank salaries. Overall, their paper support the idea that “banks play an important role in promoting
economic growth and development of counties throughout the state” (Barth et al., 2016). Our paper
extend their econometric approach including econometric regression methods. Moreover, we also
take a first step in trying to identify whether characteristics of a regional banking industry can be
explained by observable bank characteristics and whether these are driven by the socioeconomic
characteristics of the market these banks operate in.
2.3 Data
To investigate our research question, we obtained micro data on all banks in the United States that
are insured by the FDIC. This sample constitutes a large part of the U.S. retail banking market but
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does not include credit unions, which are regulated by the NCUA. We also collected data on the
socioeconomic characteristics of each state.
The data on depository institutions comes from three main sources: the Summary of Depository
Institutions (SDI), the regulatory Call Reports Data (CRD), and the Summary of Deposits (SOD).
All these datasets are provided by the the FDIC and based on financial reports filled by banks
on a quarterly basis and by its branches on a yearly basis. The financial data available include
both the income statement and the balance sheet information of each bank. The data also include
geographical location of the branches of each bank.
State regional characteristics come from three sources: the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the U.S. Census Bureau.
We focus on comparing the characteristics of WV banks with other U.S. banks; the label “US”
will refer to the entire United States and US* to the United States excluding West Virginia. In this
draft of the paper, we use data for 2017, for which the latest data were available when the project
began. Our strategy is to gain a firm understanding of the answer to our research question for the
recent cross-section of banks first. Then we willl examine the dynamics of these differences over
time in later versions of this paper or in subsequent research.
2.4 Banks and Their Markets
This section describes the types of banks studied and the markets in which they operate. It begins
with an initial assessment of the number and size of banks overall and then defines bank types and
markets. We provide a basic assessment of the composition and concentration in banking in each
market, but not a formal analysis of competition among banks in those markets.2




The U.S. banking industry has been undergoing a comprehensive restructuring, as shown in Figure
2.1. Since the 1980s, the number of banks headquartered in the United States and West Virginia has
been declining steadily and rapidly primarily due to consolidation—mergers and acquisitions stem-
ming from the relaxation of regulations against interstate banking—and to technological changes
(Aguirregabiria et al. (2016) and Alessandrini et al. (2009), respectively). Although the process
of consolidation among banks in West Virginia has been qualitatively similar to the United States
overall, consolidation has been greater and faster in West Virginia (larger vertical change in the log
scale).
Despite experiencing greater relative banking consolidation, West Virginia still has more and
smaller banks than the rest of the nation, as shown in Figure 2.2, which plots the number of banks
per capita in West Virginia versus other states (US* = U.S. less WV) by type of charter (federal and
state). Remarkably, West Virginia has nearly twice as many banks as other states (32 versus 18 per
one million residents). However, the number of banks in operation may be related to the average
size of individual banks, so Figure 2.3 plots the distributions of WV and US* bank branches by
the size of their banks’ total assets.3 Nearly four out of five WV branches belongs to a relatively
small bank ($10 billion or less in assets), compared with fewer than half in other states.
Striking differences in the rate of consolidation, and in the number and size of WV banks,
raise questions about the ability of WV banks to provide services efficiently and profitably. Of
course, it is possible that WV residents and businesses have fundamentally different demands
for banking services that require more and small banks and branches for some reason(s). If not,
however, digging deeper into the composition, behavior, and performance of WV banks may reveal
explanations for these differences.
3The switch from banks in Figure 2.2 to branches in Figure 2.3 is innocuous and for expositional convenience.
The distributions of banks by asset size are qualitatively similar to branches but difficult to depict graphically because
there are so few very large banks, even in the entire United States. The number of branches in a bank is positively
correlated with bank size.
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2.4.2 Definitions
Not all banks are alike, of course. In addition to characteristics that distinguish all types of firms,
such as age and size, banks exhibit other differences related to the nature of financial intermedia-
tion. One simple answer to this paper’s research question is that the composition of heterogenous
banks varies across geographic regions such as West Virginia. However, that answer begs another
potentially important question: why does a geographic region have different types of banks? To
ensure proper comparison of WV banks with those in other states, it is necessary to define bank
types and their markets.
A “bank” is defined as a depository institutions classified as either a commercial bank or saving
institutions (savings banks and savings associations).4 FDIC-insured branches of foreign banks are
dropped for simplicity and lack of consolidated data on their foreign banks. Banks also may be
classified by three other characteristics: 1) charter (federal or state); 2) primary regulator (FDIC,
Federal Reserve, or OCC); and 3) Federal Reserve membership (national member, state member,
or non-member). The FDIC combines these three characteristics into a single “bank class” variable
(BKCLASS) in the SOD database.
The market in which a bank operates is more challenging to define for at least two reasons.
First, since the passage of Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 allowed interstate banking, the ability to use
geographic boundaries to define banking markets has become more diverse and complex. Second,
the emergence of technology that enables online banking and the potential for branchless banking
(Alessandrini et al., 2009), which causes the definition of markets to become even more complex.
This technological change has made it possible for virtually any bank to attract customers from
across the nation instead of relying only on customers in their geographic location.
In this paper, a “banking market” is defined as a state as advocated by Radecki (1998). Before
interstate banking, state boundaries were a sensible definition, although banks in large states may
4Credit unions are depository institutions that offer similar services. However, we exclude them from the present
analysis because of their different profit status (non-profit instead of for-profit) and the additional work needed to
acquire their data come from a separate source and integrate them with the banking data described in Section 2.3.
Given the differences in banks across states reported in this paper, it would be interesting to include credit unions in
future research.
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not have operated in all cities or counties of the state. Now, however, a bank that operates branches
in multiple states may have a diverse presence across states, some of which may not even be ge-
ographically contiguous. And banks may locate their headquarters in a state due to tax policies
or other factors rather than primarily due to banking conditions in that state. Nevertheless, state
borders still reflect important differences in population density, state banking regulations, busi-
ness practices, and household behaviors that pertain to general economic differences across states.
Where feasible and sensible, we conduct some analyses that takes into account the geographic
composition of multi-state banks at the county level using information on branches from the SOD
database.
Combining the bank and market concepts, we define “WV banks” as those headquartered in
West Virginia. Banks headquartered in other states comprise other U.S. (US*) banks. Banks
that operate branches only in one state are called single-market banks (SMB), while banks that
operate branches in multiple states are called multi-market banks (MMB).5 The latter type is further
divided into two groups based on total market size by number of states (markets): small MMBs
operate branches in fewer than five states, and large MMBs operate branches in five or more states.
2.4.3 Market Composition
Figure 2.4 illustrates the composition of banks using a WV map and definitions from the previous
subsection. In 2017, there were 5,777 total U.S. banks. Only 57 banks were headquartered in West
Virginia, of which 40 were SMBs and 17 were small MMBs compared with 5,044 and 582 US*
banks, respectively, that do not have any branches in West Virginia. Thus, among these relatively
comparable market categories, West Virginia has a notably lower percentage of SMBs (70 percent
versus 90 percent). Another 94 banks are primarily large US* MMBs divided into two categories:
17 that operate branches in West Virginia and 77 that do not; US* banks operating in West Virginia
5This classification is similar to the one used by Park and Pennacchi (2008). An alternative classification is based
on the definition of community banking found in FDIC (2012) and used by Minuci (2021) However, some community
banks operate in multiple states and thus this classification does not allow mutually exclusive definitions of geographic
markets.
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are roughly evenly divided into small and large MMBs.6 This grouping enables comparison of all
banks operating in West Viriginia (74) distinguished by whether they are headquartered inside (57)
or outside (17) the state that may reveal the effects of geography-specific management strategies.
Despite popular perception, West Virginia does not appear to lack access to modern national
banking and financial markets. One measure of access to national banking markets is the state share
of deposits in SMBs depicted in Figure 2.5. States with relatively high shares of SMB deposits
may reflect a lack of adequate access to national banking services. However, the share of SMB
deposits in West Virginia actually is relatively low so WV bank customers have a relatively large
share of their deposits in banks that operate in regional or national banking markets.
Alternatively, the relatively low share of SMB deposits could signal a disproportionate influ-
ence of large national MMBs in the state banking market. Among the nation’s four very largest
commercial banks, only JPMorgan Chase has branches operating in West Virginia and its WV
deposits only accounted for 6 percent of the state total.7 One simple measure of competition in
banking markets is the share of a state’s deposits held by its largest banks. The top four banks
operating in West Virginia held 44.5 percent of state deposits in 2017 compared with 36.1 percent
for the top four banks in the United States. Thus, the WV banking market exhibits somewhat more
concentration than the U.S. national banking market.8 For more details, see the tables of top 10
banks in West Virginia and in the United States by assets and by deposits found in the Appendix.
6The US* in WV grouping is therefore heterogeneous, containing some banks that belong in either the US* small
MMBs or large MMBs categories. The latter is heavily influenced by the largest bank operating in West Virginia, JP
Morgan Chase.
7The other three banks are Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Citibank. All four megabanks have more than $1.4
trillion in assets, with Chase the largest at $2.2 trillion in 2017. The next largest bank operating in West Virginia is the
pending merger of BB&T and SunTrust, which would be only $418 billion in combined assets.
8A more formal measure of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) applied to state deposit shares.
The 4-bank HHI for West Virginia banks is 674.2, slightly higher than the estimate of 400.4 for all U.S. banks. The
HHI is a relatively simple measure of competition in a market, which is typically applied to the shares of sales or
revenue rather than deposits as in banking. An HHI of less than 1,500 is often considered indicative of a competition
market, so by this measure there do not appear to be first-order concerns about market power in banking at the WV
state or national level.
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2.5 Aggregate Banking Activity
This section begins to analyze economic differences across banks at the aggregate U.S. level and
at the WV state level in 2017.9 The first step is to use the data described in Section 2.3 to construct
cross-section estimates of corporate financial statements for banks in 2017. Bank-level financial
statements can be aggregated across all banks to the U.S. level, which serves as the benchmark for
comparing differences in banking activity across states in the next Section, or across banks within
a state. The financial statements are converted from values ($) to shares (%) to enable comparisons
across banks with enormous differences in assets.
2.5.1 Empirical Methodology
Financial statements reflect the outcomes of firms’ underlying economic behavior and illustrate
differences in business strategies, productive efficiency, customer demand, profitability, and market
value.10 We report data for banks’ two main financial statements. The balance sheet of bank
i = {1,2, . . . ,N} contains assets, Ai, and liabilities, Li, related by the identity
Ai = Li +Ei
where E is shareholders’ equity or bank capital. The income statement contains revenues, Ri, and
operating expenses (costs), Ci, related by the identity
Ri−Ci = Yi
where Yi is the bank’s net income (or profits). Each component of the balance sheet (Ai,Li) and
income statement (Ri,Ci) has j = {1, . . . ,Jk} line items, where k = {A,L,R,C}. Aggregate com-
9While analyzing difference across time is potentially interesting as well, we focus on the cross-section analysis
in this paper first and leave time-series analysis for future research. Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar for the years closely surrounding 2017 so the findings are not sensitive to changes over short periods of time.
10For more details about financial statements, see the introduction at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission:
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsbegfinstmtguidehtm.html.
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Dividing each line item of the financial statements by its component aggregate value yields the
percentage-share vectors of interest. For example,
~Ai = [a1i,a2i, . . . ,aJA,i]
where ai1 = (Ai1/Ai)× 100, and likewise for the other three components. Finally, aggregate as-
sets are obtained by summing across all banks (U.S.) or banks within a state s = {1,2, . . . ,51}





Ai and As = ∑
i∈s
Ais
Asset-share vectors ~A and ~As are calculated analogously. Note that the U.S.- and state-level finan-
cial statement shares represent the weighted-average of all banks in the nation or state and thus can
be interpreted as the average or representative agent share.
2.5.2 Aggregate Evidence
Table 2.2 compares financial statements for U.S. and WV banks in 2017. In the balance, about
three-quarters of U.S. bank liabilities are customer deposits (76.8 percent), which represent the
main source of funds for banks. About three-quarters of deposits are non-transation (56.7 percent),
or savings, more than half (30.4 percent) of which are money market deposit accounts (MMDA).
Another 11.9 percent of liabilities were in miscellaneous categories and U.S. bank capital was 11.3
percent. On the asset side, loans accounted for the largest use of funds (54.7 percent) by U.S. banks
followed by Treasury securities (20.9 percent). About half of loans are real estate (27.4 percent),
with commercial and industrial (C&I) and consumer loans accounting for most of the rest. Cash
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(currency, reserves, and other types of cash) and Other assets each accounted for about 11 percent
of assets.
The income statement shows that about two-thirds of U.S. bank revenue (67.2 percent) comes
from interest and the other third from non-interest income (32.2 percent). Given U.S. banks’ asset
portfolio allocation, it is not surprising that the largest component of interest income from real
estate loans, but foreign loans also produce substantial interest (18.6 percent). U.S. banks’ non-
interest income comes from a variety of services, none of which represents a large portion of
revenue. In contrast to revenues, U.S. banks’ expenses are much more concentrated in non-interest
categories, nearly half (41.7 percent) of which go to salaries.
Although the financial statements of WV and U.S. banks are broadly similar, Table 2.2 reveals
several statistically and economically significant differences. In terms of liabilities (sources of
funds), WV banks have a notably different composition of deposits. Transactions deposits are
about 50 percent higher (18.9 versus 12.3 percent) and non-transaction deposits slightly higher
(60.2 versus 56.7 percent) mainly because WV banks have no deposits held in foreign offices
(0.0 versus 7.8 percent). Perhaps more importantly, customers of WV banks tend to hold non-
transaction (saving) deposits much more in time deposits (21.2 percent versus 9.6 percent) than
in MMDAs (21.3 percent versus 30.4 percent). This difference suggests that WV bank customers
may be more risk averse—MMDA interest rates fluctuate—or rely more heavily on bank accounts
for longer term savings than other U.S. bank customers. WV bank capital is about the same as
U.S. banks (12.0 versus 11.3 percent).
In terms of assets (uses of funds), WV banks’ appear to hold considerably more conserva-
tive asset portfolio than other banks. WV banks invest more in loans (69.8 versus 54.7 percent)
than other risker assets (securities, repos, and other). Particularly striking is WV banks’ much
larger holdings of real estate loans (56.2 versus 27.4), which is evident in both residential and
non-residential categories. Real estate loans are secured and thus less risky with lower interest
rates. In light of the deposit behavior of WV bank customers, this result raises questions about
WV bank managers’ investment decisions. In particular, do WV bank managers choose relatively
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conservative in asset portfolios because they reflect their customers preferences, or are the WV
bank managers simply more risk averse because they mainly come from the same population as
their customers? Or is there some other reason?
Another clue about differences in WV banks is evident from the income statement. WV banks
earn a much higher proportion of their revenues (78.7 versus 67.2) from interest than non-interest
income (19.9 versus 32.2 percent). Interestingly, the difference in revenue composition does not
stem from deposit account fees (6.0 versus 4.5 percent) but rather from less intensive activity in
more investment activities that go beyond basic banking services: fiduciary activities, trading, in-
vestment, servicing, and a host of other activities (for example, see DeYoung et al., 2015). This
result raises complementary questions about the practices of WV bank managers. Is there rela-
tively conservative approach to higher risk banking services a reflection of their customers or the
managers’ own risk aversion? It does not appear that WV banks cost structure explains much of
the differences, as the expenses of WV banks is quite similar to those of all U.S. banks.
To summarize thus far, WV banks have a notably different depositor base and rely relatively
more on loans, especially real estate. These differences may be revealing insights about how
WV banking activity is related real economic growth in the state. Possible explanations may
include risk aversion (by customers and bank managers), lower incomes and wealth of WV bank
customers, and lower skills or productivity levels of WV bank managers. Whatever the reason(s),
WV banks are less profitable, as can be seen from the asset-weighted rate of return on assets
(ROA) plotted in Figure 2.6 from 2009-2017 for WV and U.S. banks. The ROA of U.S. banks
was higher than WV banks by about .10 percentage points on average since 2012. Thus, the
different financial choices of WV banks appear to have moderate negative consequences for their
profitability. Interestingly, however, WV banks fared much better than U.S. banks during the
Financial Crisis and Great Recession of 2007-2009. Despite holding about twice as high a share
of real estate loans, the ROA of WV banks declined only about .50 percentage points compared to
more than 1.25 percentage points for U.S. banks.11
11This striking time series evidence is related to the literature connecting loan portfolios to bank stability, such as
Shim (2019) and Tabak et al. (2011). This line of research merits further investigation but is beyond the scope of this
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2.5.3 Evidence by Market
This subsection provides a deeper look at differences in WV banks by disaggregating the results
from the previous subsection into the six markets defined in Section 2.4. This analysis begins with
a stricter distinction between WV and U.S. banks. Rather than aggregating across all U.S. banks,
which would include WV banks, we define US* banks as all U.S. banks excluding WV banks (i.e.,
those headquartered in West Virginia). However, because some US* banks operate branches in
West Virginia, they can be considered part of the WV banking market and thus should be included
in answers to the paper title.
Due to the large amount of numeric results, this subsection provides evidence on bank financial
statements by market using graphs rather than tables for faster and easier comprehension. Each
figure contains six panels of graphs with two rows:
1. WV banks: a) WV SMBs; b) WV MMBs; and c) US* in WV MMBs
2. US* banks not in WV: a) US* SMBs; b) US* small MMBs; and c) US* large MMBs.
US* MMBs are divided into small and large groups according to the number of markets; small
MMBs operate in up to five states, large MMBs in more than five states. The size definition was
chosen to approximate the scope of WV MMBs, so comparing two graphs vertically provides a
roughly apples-to-apples assessment of WV and US* markets.
2.5.3.1 Sources of Funds: Liabilities
Like the aggregate analysis, the overall structure of liabilities in WV and US* banks is broadly
similar across markets, as shown in Figure 2.7. Interest-bearing deposits are by far the largest
item (more than half), followed by non-interest-bearing deposits and capital. There is a modest
difference across banking markets—interest bearing deposits have the highest share for SMBs and
decline as banks increase in size. However, there is little difference between WV and US* banks
in this pattern.
paper and thus left for future research.
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Non-transaction (saving) accounts exhibit notably more differences between WV and US*
banks and across markets, as highlighted in Figure 2.8. Most striking is that WV SMBs hold
far less MMDA deposits (11 percent) than other banks, including other WV banks and even other
US* SMBs. Instead, WV SMBs have high amounts of other saving deposits (35 percent, including
traditional passbook saving) and time deposits of all maturities, accounts that are safer and lower
cost to banks (lower return to bank customers). Interestingly, US* MMBs operating in West Vir-
ginia have by far the highest share of MMDA deposits (66 percent). This finding reveals that at
least some WV bank customers can obtain higher return deposits from in-person brick-and-morter
branches without having to go to online banking.12 This result does not appear to stem from large
differences in the interest rates offered by WV versus US* banks, as shown in the Appendix.
2.5.3.2 Uses of Funds: Assets
The relative dominance of real estate loans in the aggregate WV asset portfolios exhibits a more
nuanced pattern across banking markets, as shown in Figure 2.9. Most notably, US* banks operat-
ing in WV hold only 23 percent of assets in real estate loans compared with more than 50 percent
for banks headquartered in West Virginia. Further, the asset portfolio of US* banks in WV is simi-
lar to the large US* banks not operating in WV. Thus, it appears that banks do not specialize in real
estate loans just because they operate in West Virginia; rather managers of banks headquartered in
West Virgina decide to specialize in real estate loans for some reason(s). This result also is evident
from the higher shares of real estate assets in WV SMBs and MMBs relative to their US* cohorts.
The tendency of smaller banks to specialize in real estate loans is considerably more pro-
nounced in West Virginia (52 versus 31 percent), where as US* SMBS have more consumer and
other loans. We notice WV banks seem to have a conservative approach towards its loan activities.
For instance, they seem to hold a lower share of riskier (no collateral) loans such as credit cards
and business loans, and instead hold more real estate loans.
12Of course, this conclusion requires data on the customers of banks in West Virginia and further analysis of how
types of households choose banking relationships. Future research on the joint customer-bank relationships are likely
to enhance understanding of how WV banks are different.
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2.5.3.3 Revenues: Income
Not surprisingly, WV and US* banks’ revenues shares in each market, shown in Figure 2.10, are
similar to their asset portfolio shares in Figure 2.9. Banks headquartered in West Virginia have
a higher share of interest income from real estate loans, naturally. As in the aggregate data, WV
banks a much lower share of non-interest income, but only banks headquartered in West Virginia.
US* banks operating in West Virginia actually have the highest share of non-interest income (43
percent) in any market. Once again, the data indicate that operating in West Virginia is not the
reason for differences; rather, managers of banks headquarted in WV choose a different business
strategy than managers of banks coming into West Virginia. This result is potentially important
because low shares of non-interest income have been shown to indicate higher probability of bank
failure (Berger et al. (2016); DeYoung and Torna (2013); and Williams (2016)). The further de-
composition of noninterest income is reported in Figure 2.11.
2.5.3.4 Costs: Expenses
Unlike other aspects of the financial statements, the cost structure of WV banks exhibits very little
difference from other U.S. banks in any banking market. A figure of components of expenses in
the income statement by banking market can be found in the Appendix. Average interest rates paid
by WV banks for deposit accounts exhibit two modest differences from US* banks: 1) WV banks
tend to offer lower interest on savings accounts; and 2) multi-market banks operating in WV tend
to offer on average lower interest on interest-bearing deposit accounts and time deposits. A figure
of deposit rates by banking market also can be found in the Appendix.
2.5.4 Return on Assets
Turning again to ROA as a summary statistic of the implications of financial differences in WV
banks, Figure 2.12 shows important heterogeneity among banking markets. During the expansion
(2012-2017), all US* banks had higher ROA than their WV bank counterparts but the difference
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is greater more for banks headquartered in West Virginia. The gap is largest for WV SMBs, which
had an average ROA about 1/3 percentage point less than US* SMBs. On the other hand, it is these
lower performing banks headquartered in West Virginia that experienced by far the least decline in
ROA during 2007-2010. In contrast, US* banks operating in West Virginia, which is dominated by
JP Morgan Chase, experienced a similar decline in ROA to other U.S. banks. Notably, even US*
SMBs experienced a very large, though milder, decline in ROA unlike WV SMBs.
2.6 Econometric Models
Section 2.5 documents potentially interesting and important differences between WV and US*
banks in financial activity at aggregate and banking market levels. The evidence in Sections 2.4
and 2.5.1 suggests the reason is that West Virginia has different types of banks. This section re-
ports tests of this hypothesis that composition of bank types explains observed differences between
WV and US* banks. The tests are based on estimates of reduced-form, cross-section models of
financial shares at the individual bank level that control for exogenous variables defining bank type
and regional (state-level) economic activity. If differences remain after the controls, they likely
reflect endogenous economic choices and business strategies that will require structural modeling
to explain.
2.6.1 Regression Specifications
The baseline regression model is specified as follows. Let ykjis denote the endogenous variable of
interest for bank i = {1, ...,5777} headquarted in state s = {1, ...,51} from the financial statement
shares {~Ais, ~Lis, ~Ris, ~Eis} as defined in Section 2.5. For each financial share, the fixed-effects model
is
y jis = αkjs +β
k
j Xis + ε
k
jis ∀ j ∈ Jk and k = {A,L,R,C} (2.1)
where αks is the state fixed effect and Xis = BANKis is a vector of bank-specific explanatory vari-
ables that include class, ownership structure, government regulator, age, size, and scope of the bank
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as described in the Appendix in Table G.1. Except for size and scope, all explanatory variables are
categorical with one category excluded from the regression. All data are at the consolidated bank
level and banks are assigned to the state in which it is headquartered.
There are four continuous variables of bank size and scope, which are presumed exogenous for
the purpose of time t financial decisions. Two variables represent bank size: 1) log average value
of deposits (nominal dollars); and 2) share of total deposits (percentage of U.S. deposits). Because
MMBs operate in more than one state, two other variables represent bank scope (market defined
by states): 1) share of states in which the bank operates (percentage out of 51); and 2) share of
population of the states in which it operates (percentage of national population). Although these
explanatory bank variables are endogenously determined in the long run, they can probably be
taken by the bank at least as predetermined, and possibly exogenous, in the short run when making
endogenous decisions about the asset and liability management.
Because the financial shares sum to 100, the regression models in equation (2.1) form a system
of equations. For example, the system of equations for asset shares is
a1is = αA1s +β
A
1 Xis + ε
A
1is
a2is = αA2s +β
A





aJAi s = α
A
JAs
+β AJAXis + ε
A
JAi s
The asset shares, a jis, are linearly dependent. However, the full system can be estimated equation-
by-equation because the explanatory variables all have the same explanatory variables; see Theil
(1971) for more details and Schuh and Stavins (2010) for an example of this econometric approach
applied to shares of payments made by consumers using payment instruments.
Although the baseline fixed-effect model can identify state-level differences in financial shares,
there is evidence—including Table 2.1—of variation in state-level economic activity that also may
contribute to differences in banking behavior across states. Moulton (1990) shows that adding
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macro (aggregate) variables, such as state real GDP, to micro (bank-level) regressions (2.1) induces
downward bias in standard errors, which requires an ex post correction to obtain proper estimates
of parameter uncertainty. The problem stems from a lack of variation in the macro variables across
micro units, which imparts an error to the state fixed effect: αs = α0 +ηs, where η is a state-
level error that is correlated with Xis and thus violates one of the key Gauss-Markov assumptions
underlying the fixed-effects regression (For more detailed info see Hausman and Taylor (1981) and
Bafumi and Gelman (2006)).
To address this problem, we use a multi-level mixed-effects model that explicitly specifies the
varying intercept in (2.1).13 Suppresssing the j and k notation, the random state effect can be
written as
αs = α0 + γzZs + γxX̄s +ηs (2.2)
where Zs is a vector of state-level economic variables, X̄s = ∑i∈s Xis is a vector of average of bank
characteristics within a state, and ηs is the random error. Equations (2.1) and (2.2) represent the
mixed-effects model, which can be combined and written as





is =(εis+ηs). For properly chosen Zs and X̄s, E[Xisε
′
is] = 0 and there is no longer a violation
of the Gauss-Markov assumption.
2.6.2 Estimation
The baseline fixed-effects model (2.1) is estimated with OLS for each financial share. For compar-
ison with Section 2.5.2, we estimate just two state effects (αWV and αUS∗) to quantify differences
in the average financial shares of WV banks after controlling for individual bank characteristics
(Xis).14 The null hypothesis tested is H0 : αWV = αUS∗ , a standard coefficient restriction that pro-
13We thank Marcin Hitzcenko for introducing us to this methodology. See Gelman et al. (2008) for an application
to modeling of regional variation in U.S. presidential voting.
14This approach was popularized in the international trade literature by Bernard and Jensen (1999).
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duces an F-statistic.15 Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that WV banks behave differently
than other banks for reasons other than differences in the composition of bank types in the state.
The estimated fixed effects will be roughly comparable in magnitude to the empirical estimates in
Section 2.5.1 (as they should be) but not exactly the same due to the presence of controls (βXis).
For this reason, the results include estimates of the state fixed effects without the controls.
The multi-level mixed-effects model (2.1) and (2.2) is estimated with maximum likelihood for
selected financial shares that exhibit the most economic relevance.16 To investigate the potential
uniqueness of all states, we estimate the mixed-effects model with 51 separate state random effects.
Although the random effects (2.2) are not estimated directly, we capture their best linear unbiased
predictions (BLUP), α̂s, for further analysis. Absent a structural model, it is difficult to form strong
prior beliefs about the most suitable state-level variables, Zs. After some exploration, we settled
on two common measures of aggregate economic activity: 1) log of real state income per capita;
and 2) five-year population growth rate.17 Options for X̄s variables are limited by the fact that most
are dummy variables, hence only the continuous variables are eligible (three measures of bank and
market size plus the log average branch deposit value).
Both econometric models make two simplifying assumptions. First, despite the evidence of
variation across banking market in Section 2.5.3, the regression coefficients do not vary between
SMBs and MMBs. In part, this assumption is necessary because the total number of banks head-
quartered in West Virginia is small (57), so further disaggregation would reduce precision. Second,
we assume that the effects of observable bank characteristics on financial activity (β ) are the same
for all banks regardless of geography and thus estimate only random-intercept models, not random-
slope models. For example, this restriction assumes bank size is correlated with financial shares
similarly for WV and all US* banks. This assumption seems like a reasonable starting point absent
an obvious economic reason to expect otherwise, but may be worth exploring in future research.
Details of the regression data and sample are as follows. All data used in estimation are for
15Although the regressions are weighted by bank size, we still use the “white.adjust” option of the linearHypothesis
command in R for a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test.
16This model can be estimated with the R command lmer or the STATA command xtmixed.
17Alternative random effects explored are listed in the Z Variables section in the Appendix in Table G.1.
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2017:Q2. Regressions are weighted by banks’ shares of total U.S. bank assets except for the
regression components of real estate loans, which are weighted by a bank’s share of total U.S.
real estate loans. Each regression uses the full sample of U.S. banks described in Section 2.3.
Controls for bank size and market size are defined by the state in which a bank is headquartered.
While this definition is fine for SMBs, the market for a large MMB operating in many states is
much larger than the state in which it is headquartered. In fact, the state in which an MMB is
headquartered may have been chosen for certain purposes such as favorable tax treatments and
may be very differerent from the other states in which the MMB operates. Thus, for robustness,
we also estimated the econometric models with a subsample of only SMBs to identify potential
influences stemming from multi-market banking. The results were qualitatively and quantitatively
similar to the full sample estimates.18
2.7 Results
This section reports the results of estimating the econometric models in Section 2.6. For each
model, the dependent variables are financial statement shares measured in percent.
2.7.1 Fixed-effects Models
Estimation results for the fixed-effects models appear in Tables 2.3 through 2.10, organized by
financial statement. Each table reports the fixed-effects coefficients first, followed by the controls.
The bottom of each table reports regression diagnostic statistics. For comparison with the data por-
trayed in the figures of Section 2.5.3, the first two lines report fixed-effect estimates from separate
regressions that exclude the controls. The statistic labeled “F.E. (fixed-effects) contribution” is the
ratio of adjusted R2 for the regression without controls to that of the full regression. The p-value
of the hypothesis test for differences between WV and US* is of central interest; values below .10
indicate likely significant differences in West Virginia banks.
18Results for estimation with the SMB subsample are available on request.
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2.7.1.1 Sources of Funds: Liabilities
After controlling for bank characteristics, WV bank are remarkably similar to other banks except
for the distribution of interest-bearing accounts. Table 2.3 shows that only two high-level cat-
egories of liabilities—non-interest bearing deposits (slightly lower) and Federal Reserve reverse
repos (slightly higher)—are statistically significantly different from US* banks, but both are 2
percentage points or less apart.
Digging deeper into interest-bearing accounts reveals that WV banks exhibit economically sig-
nificant differences in deposits. Table 2.4 shows statistically significant differences in WV banks’
small time deposits, where categories less than $250,000 are about 3 percentage points higher
each than in US* banks (12.4 versus 8.8 percent and 12.3 versus 9.5 percent, respectively). Al-
though not statistically significant, WV banks’ share of money market deposit accounts (MMDA)
is almost 11 percentage points lower (24.3 versus 34.8 percent); likewise, WV banks’ share of
transaction deposits is almost 5 percentage points higher than US* banks. Although statistically
weak, these point estimates affirm the earlier observation that WV depositors tend to favor safer
deposit accounts with lower returns than other US* depositors for some reason.
2.7.1.2 Uses of Funds: Assets
After controlling for bank characteristics, WV banks’ asset portfolios remain notably different
from other U.S. banks. Table 2.5 shows that all WV bank loan shares except other consumer loans
are statistically significantly different from US* banks’ shares. In particular, WV real estate loans
are nearly 12 percentage points higher (58.4 versus 46.9 percent) than US*, an economically large
differential. In contrast, the WV shares of C&I, credit card, and other non-consumer loans are all
statistically significantly lower than corresponding US* banks’ shares. For these loan categories,
the controls have important economic effects, especially for C&I loans where the WV and US*
fixed effects dropped from 8.2 and 12 percentage points, respectively, to .5 and 3.6 percentage
points. For all non-loan assets, however, WV shares are insignificantly different from other US*
banks.
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Digging deeper into real estate loans reveals that WV banks’ specialization primarily reflects
a heavy emphasis on lending for smaller residential properties. Table 2.6 shows that WV banks
have 14 percentage points more (53.2 versus 39.3 percent) real estate loans for 1-4 unit residential
properties than US* banks. The bulk of this difference is accounted for by US* banks’ greater
shares of lending for non-residential, non-farm (i.e., commercial) real estate (33.9 versus 25.5
percent) and agricultural real estate (4.9 versus −0.2 percent). Interestingly, WV banks do not
lend significantly less for either contruction development or for larger family units (5+) such as
apartment and condominium complexes.
2.7.1.3 Revenues: Income
Controlling for bank characteristics, the sources of income for WV banks is essentially the same
as other U.S. banks except for differences in loan interest that largely mirrors the asset-portifolio
differences discussed earlier. Table 2.7 shows that WV banks have much higher shares of income
from real estate loans (59.7 versus 47.6 percent) and proportionately lower shares of income from
business and other loans. This result is a natural and unsurprising consequence of WV banks’
relative specialization in real estate assets. More surprising is that large differences in non-interest
income between WV and US* banks at the aggregate level (19 and 32 percent, respectively, in
Table 2.2) essentially disappear after controlling for bank characteristics (1.7 versus 2.7 percent).
Thus, in the case of non-interest income, the composition of WV banks accounts for observed
differences; higher WV shares of state member banks, saving associations, and bank holding com-
panies are key contributors.
Digging deeper into non-interest income reveals many components with economically large
differences between WV and US* banks but few that are statistically significant. Table 2.8 shows
only two significant differences. WV banks’ shares are about 3-4 percentage points lower than
US* banks for other investment income (5.6 versus 9.2 percent) and service-fee income, including
fees on real estate loans (1.7 versus 4.8 percent). Large but statistically insignificant differences in
point estimates arise for two categories that account for about half of non-interest income: sales
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of assets and other non-interest income. WV banks have higher shares of asset sales (24.5 ver-
sus 7.8 percent) and lower shares other non-interest income (20.7 versus 40.4 percent). Also not
statistically significant but economically intriguing are WV banks’ greater shares of income from
fiduciary activity (10.6 versus 5.0 percent) and deposit account fees (34.9 versus 29.9 percent).
2.7.1.4 Costs: Expenses
After controlling for bank characteristics, the cost structure of WV banks is only moderately dif-
ferent from other US* banks. Table 2.9 shows that interest expenses, which account for less than
one-fifth of all banks expenses, are insignificantly different for WV and US* banks but the labor
and physical capital components of non-interest expenses are significantly different. WV banks’
share of share of salaries and benefits is about 5 percentage points lower than in US* banks (43.7
versus 48.9 percent) and WV banks’ share of net physical capital (structures and fixed assets) ex-
penses and other non-interest expenses are higher by a similar proportion, although the latter is not
statistically significantly so.
Digging deeper into the relatively smaller component of interest expenses reveals larger and
economically significant cost differentials that reflect the patterns of deposit shares discussed ear-
lier. Table 2.10 shows that WV banks have nearly one-third as much interest expenses on savings
accounts (11.1 versus 28.3 percent), which include MMDAs, as do US* banks.19 On the other
hand, WV banks have nearly twice as much interest expenses for transaction accounts (11.0 versus
6.0 percent) and, not surprisingly, about 10 pecentage points more for time deposit accounts (50.3
versus 40.1 percent), although the latter is not statistically significant.
2.7.1.5 Summary of Fixed-effects Results
The main finding from the fixed-effects model estimation is that the composition of bank types does
not fully explain economically significant differences in financial behavior between WV and US*
banks. Two key differences remain between WV and US* banks. First, WV banks receive deposit
19In separate calculations not reported here, we find that WV banks do not pay significantly different interest rates
on deposits so the difference in interest costs must result from higher average saving account balances in US* banks.
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portfolios that rely more heavily on transaction accounts and on less risky non-transation accounts
that offer safer, lower returns. Heteregeneity in the customer base of WV banks may play a role
in explaining this difference. Second, WV banks also invest in asset portfolios that rely heavily
on real estate loans, especially those for small (1-4 unit) residential mortgages. Heterogeneity in
the bank managers of WV banks may play a role in explaining this difference. To the extent that
WV bank managers are also part of the population of WV bank customers, there may be common
factors in the characteristics of the managers and customers. Heterogeneity in the economic profile
of West Virginia likely plays a role in explaining differences as well, potentially influencing both
deposit and bank management decisions.
2.7.2 Mixed-effects Models
This subsection reports results for the mixed-effects mode, narrowing the focus to real estate loan
shares because they are the most economically important difference between WV* and US* banks.
We do not report estimates for the bank characteristics (β ) because they are essentially the same
as in the fixed-effects models.20 Instead, this section analyzes all 51 state effects to expand the
scope beyond West Virginia and explore the role of regional economic conditions in bank financial
behavior. For comparison, α̂0 is 39.1 (1.84 standard error) for the fixed-effects model with 50 states
(CO excluded because it is closest to the constant) and 40.1 (2.10) for the mixed-effects model.
The heat map in Figure 2.13 shows no clear regional pattern in the actual data on real estate
loan shares by the state of banks’ headquarters. Banks in most states west of the Mississippi River
have relatively low shares, especially NV, UT, and SD, but there are many exceptions. States in the
northwest corner (WA and OR), northern border (MO, ND, and MN), and southwest corner (AR
and LA) of that area have high shares. East of the Mississippi River, real estate shares vary widely
across states. States with high shares in the Mid-Atlantic (WV, MD, NJ), New England (VT, NH,
ME), and Southwest (SC, FL) are separated by states with relatively low shares (e.g., MA, VA, and
20Indeed, the estimated coefficients in the mixed-effects model are typically within one significant digit (integer or
one decimal place) of the fixed-effects estimates, as they should be. A full set of regression results for the mixed-effects
model is available upon request.
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NC).21
Fitted state-level estimates of real estate loan shares from the mixed-effects model (orange
bars) are plotted in Figure 2.13 along with the data (black bars) and states appearing in ascending
order. Most states have actual loan shares of roughly 35 to 55 percent but some have much larger
or smaller shares. Five states have loan shares greater than 60 percent and four of them are in New
England (NJ is the fifth). Eight states have loan shares less than 35 percent with no geographic
pattern; the two lowest are less than 15 percent and contiguous (NV and UT) but the other six are
spread out.
Figure 2.13 includes two types of fitted values (ŷs). The top panel contains fitted values using
only the intercept and estimated bank characteristics, α̂0+ β̂Xit . These fitted values are essentially
flat for all but about three of the relatively low shares (SD, OH, and NC). Thus, bank characteristics
alone systematically overpredict low shares and underpredict high shares, although there is a bit
more cross-state variation in the fitted values for lower shares than higher shares. This result
confirms that variation in the composition of bank types across banks does not explain real estate
shares well.
The bottom panel of Figure 2.13 contains fitted values from the full mixed-effects model.
Adding random state-effects clearly improves the fit of the full model (relative to bank charac-
teristics only) by generally raising estimates for higher loan shares and lowering them for lower
loan shares. Indeed, the cross-state standard deviation of errors for the full model is about 17 per-
cent lower (12.17 versus 10.13) than for the model with bank characteristics only. However, the
errors from the full model are still sufficiently large to be economically significant; in fact, some
fitted values of the full model make larger errors than the restricted model with bank characteristics
only. Thus, the addition of regional variables does not change the basic conclusion that observ-
able characteristics—at the bank or state-level—do not explain variation in real estate loan shares
across states.
21The real estate shares have somewhat different regional patterns when disaggregated by banking market (SMB,
MMB small, and MMB large). The difference is most pronounced for SMBs, where some states have few if any of
those banks. However, even in that case the correlation of real estate shares between SMBs and all banks (depicted in
Figure 2.13) is still .76 and there is still no clear regional pattern.
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Model errors (ys− ŷs) for both the full mixed-effects model and the standard fixed-effects model
with 50 state effects are plotted in Figure 2.14 (orange and green, respectively). Two results are
particularly striking:
• Average absolute errors are notably smaller (roughly 1 percentage point) for the half of
states with loan shares more than about 43 percent. This group includes West Virginia, so
WV banks are not especially different when it comes to explaining relatively high shares of
real estate loans. However, errors in states with higher loan shares can be 5 percentage points
or more, which are economically large and merit further explanation.
• Average absolute errors are considerably larger (roughly 8 percentage points) in states with
shares less than 42 percent. Four states (NV, VA, SD, and MA) have absolute errors of
more than 20 percentage points and about a half dozen more have errors of 10-20 percentage
points. Thus, with respect to real estate loans, the most unusual states are actually those with
unusually low shares, not states like West Virginia with high shares. Investigating why some
states have banks that hold unusually low real estate shares may be an illuminating path for
future research to discover the economic reasons why banks differ across states.
The magnitudes and patterns of these model errors reinforce the important conclusion that observ-
able state and bank characteristics do not explain economically important differences in banks’
real estate loan investment decisions. Instead, other factors must be influencing these decisions.
Another important finding from Figure 2.14 is that the two models’ errors are quite similar for
all states (means and cross-state standard deviations almost numerically identical). Thus, the addi-
tion of state-level variables and introduction of random effects depending on real GDP per capita
and population growth does not make a significant contribution to the overall fit of loan shares,
although the interpretation of the state effects is enhanced somewhat (more below). The modest
differences between the model errors can be seen more clearly in Figure 2.16, which contains a
scatter plot of the fixed and random state effects contributions (relative to the CO state effect, which
was the closest to the intercept). The contributions are highly positively correlated, lying close to
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the 45-degree line. However, the fixed-effects contributions tend to be consistently and increas-
ingly larger than the random effects contributions when both are positive. This result suggests that
regional economic variables are explaining part of the data, especially for states with higher shares.
Finally, we can decompose the relative contributions of the two state-level variables to the
random effects, as shown in Figure 2.17. Note that unlike previous figures, these contributions
are not plotted in ascending order of state loan shares but rather are organized by geographic re-
gion. The vertical lines represent the Census Bureau’s four regions (solid black) and nine divisions
(gray).22 Overall, state real GDP per-capita is the most important regional effect explaining banks’
real estate shares across states and in most states it is by far the dominant component. The popu-
lation component is non-trivial in some states but close to zero in many others. Interestingly, the
state-level variables tend to make mostly negative contributions to state effects for the West and
Midwest regions, and mostly positive contributions in the Northeast and South regions. Exploring
alternative state-level economic variables and investigating the role of regional economic factors is
an important task for future research.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates differences in financial and economic behavior among banks of different
states. The original motivation was to ask and answer the question whether West Virginia banks
are different from other banks in the United States and investigate whether those differences might
be related to differential economic growth in West Virginia. The results suggest that, yes, WV
banks are different in two important ways: 1) their customers make significantly different deposit
decisions than other banks; and 2) their bank managers make significantly different decisions about
asset portfolio allocations, primarily banks headquartered in West Virginia and not banks from
outside the state operating in West Virginia. In both cases, then, the residents of West Virginia
22The states are listed geographically roughly from from left to right and clockwise, with the following order of
the nine Census regions: Pacific (#9, four states); Mountain (#8, eight); West North Central (#4, seven); East North
Central (#3, five); Middle Atlantic (#2, three); New England (#1, six); South Atlantic (#5, nine); East South Central
(#6, four); and West South Central (#7, four).
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and the surrounding region likely have different characteristics that drive their deposit and asset
management behavior. Investigating this possibility seems like a fruitful direction of research.
Other states also have banks with interesting financial and economic difference as well. This
paper only investigates heterogeneity in banks’ real estate loan shares across states, but it reports
interesting features. West Virginia is not the only state with banks specializing in real estate loans,
as some have more than 60 percent of their assets invested (compared to 57 percent in West Vir-
ginia). However, the most economically different states have banks with less than half the share of
WV banks (25 percent less). These states have banks that specialize in assets different from real
estate loans.
We find that differences in banks’ financial and economic behavior across states is not well
explained by differences in the composition of bank types across states. While there are important
differences in bank types across states, those differences do not explain why banks have different
depositor and bank manager behaviors. An important implication of this result is the need for more
research to model banks’ profit maximizing behavior. Strategies to attract certain types of deposits
are jointly determined with strategies to invest loanable funds in bank assets. Understanding this
optimization problem better is necessary to explain cross-state differences in bank behavior and
how they related to real economic growth. Until then, it is premature to draw conclusions about
how differences in state banking markets contribute to state economic conditions.
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Table 2.1: 2017 Regional Characteristics: WV vs. US
WV US US–WV WV/US
Population (millions) 1.8 366.3 364.5 0.0050
Population growth (% 5 years) −2.0 3.2 5.2
Age (share >65, %) 18.3 15.6 −2.7
Real income per capita ($1,000) 42.0 49.0 7.0 0.86
Unemployment rate (%) 5.2 4.4 −0.8
LF participation rate (%) 53.3 62.8 9.5
Home ownership rate (%) 75.1 63.9 −11.2
Median existing home price ($1,000) 112 194 82 0.58
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Figure 2.1: Number of Banks
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Figure 2.2: Banks per Capita by Charter, 2017
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Branches by Asset Size, 2017
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Figure 2.4: Composition of WV Banking Industry, 2017
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Figure 2.5: SMB Deposit Shares by State, 2017
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Table 2.2: Financial Statements for U.S. and WV Banks, 2017
BALANCE SHEET
ASSETS US% WV% LIABILITIES US% WV%
Cash and Balances Due 11.0 4.3 Deposits 76.8 79.2
   Currency 0.4 0.5    Transaction 12.3 18.9
   Reserves 6.9 1.4    Non-transaction 56.7 60.2
   Other 3.6 2.5       MMDA 30.4 21.3
Securities 20.9 18.1       Other saving 16.6 17.7
Loans 54.7 69.8       Time deposits 9.6 21.2
   Real estate 27.4 56.2          < $250k 6.2 18.6
      Residential 16.6 31.3          $250k 3.4 2.7
      Non-residential 10.8 24.9    Held in Foreign Offices 7.8 0.0
   C&I 11.6 8.2 Repos from the Fed 1.5 2.9
   Consumer 9.2 4.1 Other borrowed funds 6.4 5.1
      Credit cards 4.6 0.1 Other liabilities 4.0 0.8
      Other consumer 4.6 4.0
   Other loans 7.1 2.0 Equity 11.3 12.0
   Net of earned income 0.0 0.0
   Allowance for Loan Losses 0.7 0.7
Repos sold to Fed 2.4 0.4
Other assets 11.1 7.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Addenda
Interest-bearing accounts 57.0 61.1
Non-interest bearing accounts 19.7 18.1
INCOME STATEMENT
REVENUES US% WV% EXPENSES US% WV%
Interest Income 67.2 78.7 Interest Expense 12.3 13.6
   Loans 53.0 68.0    Deposit Accounts 6.7 10.5
      Real Estate 22.9 55.4       Transaction Accounts 0.6 1.3
      C&I 8.7 8.1       Nontransaction Accounts 6.1 9.2
      Consumer 16.6 4.4           Saving Accounts 2.8 2.2
      Other 4.9 0.1           Time Deposits 3.4 7.0
   Securities 9.9 9.6    Purchased Fed Repos 0.3 1.0
   Other 4.2 1.0    US Treasuries Securities 3.6 1.8
Noninterest Income 32.2 19.9    Other 1.7 0.3
   Fiduciary Activities 4.3 2.7 Noninterest Expense 87.7 86.4
   Deposit Accounts Charges 4.5 6.0    Salaries 41.7 43.9
   Trading 3.3 0.0    Assets 9.4 11.2
   Investment 2.1 0.8    Other 36.6 31.3
   Servicing Fees 1.6 0.1
   Securization 0.2 0.0
   Sales of Assets 1.9 3.0
   Other 14.4 7.3
TOTAL 99.4 98.7 TOTAL 100.0 100.0
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Figure 2.6: WV and U.S. Banks ROA, 2009-2017
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Figure 2.7: WV and US* Bank Liabilities by Market, 2017
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Figure 2.8: WV and US* Bank Non-transaction Accounts by Market, 2017
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Figure 2.9: WV and US* Bank Assets by Market, 2017
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Figure 2.10: WV and US* Bank Revenues by Market, 2017
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Figure 2.11: WV and US* Bank Noninterest Income by Market, 2017
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Figure 2.12: WV and US* Bank ROA by Market, 2009-2017
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Table 2.3: Liabilites and Equity
Dependent Variable:
IntAccts NonIntAccts Frepp OthBorFunds OthLiab Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WV 58.68∗∗∗ 15.77∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗ 8.65∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 12.43∗∗∗
(2.65) (2.44) (0.43) (1.62) (0.51) (0.81)
US* 58.75∗∗∗ 16.22∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 9.50∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗ 12.47∗∗∗
(0.80) (0.73) (0.13) (0.49) (0.15) (0.24)
Class: Nonmember 4.61 −0.15 0.49 −1.85 −0.37 −2.73∗
(4.62) (4.26) (0.75) (2.83) (0.90) (1.41)
Class: State Member −3.33∗∗∗ 7.98∗∗∗ 0.09 −4.08∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.36) (0.06) (0.24) (0.08) (0.12)
Class: Savings Bank 8.16∗ −6.14 0.24 1.93 −1.29 −2.90∗∗
(4.67) (4.31) (0.76) (2.87) (0.91) (1.43)
Class: Savings Assoc. 14.55∗∗∗ −7.44∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗ −3.59∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ −2.41∗∗∗
(0.92) (0.85) (0.15) (0.56) (0.18) (0.28)
Owned: Multi-BHC 3.82∗∗∗ −5.82∗∗∗ 0.07 −0.55 1.87∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.68) (0.12) (0.45) (0.14) (0.22)
Owned: Single-BHC 2.71∗∗∗ −0.99 0.27∗∗ −1.47∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.14
(0.70) (0.65) (0.12) (0.43) (0.14) (0.22)
Reg. by FDIC −4.52 2.73 −0.49 −0.14 −0.05 2.48∗
(4.59) (4.24) (0.75) (2.82) (0.89) (1.41)
Age: 0-10 yrs 4.09∗∗∗ −6.01∗∗∗ −0.12 1.10∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.51) (0.09) (0.34) (0.11) (0.17)
Age: 10-20 yrs 5.91∗∗∗ −4.35∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.22 −0.56∗∗∗ −0.16
(0.52) (0.48) (0.09) (0.32) (0.10) (0.16)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits 0.30∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Market Size: Share of States 0.26∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.22∗∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.37∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
WV coef. for base regression: 61 18 2.9 5.1 0.76 12
US* coef. for base regression: 57 20 1.5 6.4 4 11
F.E. Contribution: 0.99 0.91 0.73 0.95 0.7 0.99
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.97 0.72 0.02 0.67 0.35 0.96
Adjusted R2 0.98 0.87 0.59 0.60 0.89 0.95
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total assets.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Domestic Deposits
Dependent Variable:
TransDep MMDAs OthSav TmDep0-250k TmDep250k
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WV 19.41∗∗∗ 16.01∗∗∗ 14.94∗∗∗ 18.67∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗
(2.37) (4.91) (3.47) (1.93) (1.42)
US* 14.45∗∗∗ 25.49∗∗∗ 13.81∗∗∗ 13.24∗∗∗ 7.23∗∗∗
(0.71) (1.48) (1.04) (0.58) (0.43)
Class: Nonmember −9.52∗∗ 30.24∗∗∗ −2.00 −10.28∗∗∗ −2.84
(4.14) (8.57) (6.05) (3.36) (2.48)
Class: State Member 3.48∗∗∗ −3.25∗∗∗ −3.84∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.72) (0.51) (0.28) (0.21)
Class: Savings Bank −13.85∗∗∗ 21.55∗∗ 9.79 −7.98∗∗ −3.87
(4.19) (8.67) (6.13) (3.40) (2.51)
Class: Savings Assoc. −3.34∗∗∗ 13.25∗∗∗ −0.005 −2.58∗∗∗ −3.14∗∗∗
(0.82) (1.70) (1.20) (0.67) (0.49)
Owned: Multi-BHC −3.10∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗∗ −4.99∗∗∗ −6.90∗∗∗ 0.34
(0.66) (1.36) (0.96) (0.54) (0.39)
Owned: Single-BHC −1.50∗∗ 6.63∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ −1.98∗∗∗ −1.81∗∗∗
(0.63) (1.31) (0.92) (0.51) (0.38)
Reg. by FDIC 11.93∗∗∗ −35.64∗∗∗ 2.26 15.02∗∗∗ 1.96
(4.12) (8.53) (6.02) (3.35) (2.47)
Age: 0-10 yrs −4.34∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗∗ −1.45∗∗∗
(0.49) (1.02) (0.72) (0.40) (0.29)
Age: 10-20 yrs −2.17∗∗∗ 7.03∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 0.59 −2.16∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.97) (0.68) (0.38) (0.28)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits 0.63∗∗∗ −3.02∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03)
Market Size: Share of States −0.10∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Size: Share of Pop. 0.01 0.22∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
WV coef. for base regression: 19 21 18 19 2.7
US* coef. for base regression: 12 30 17 6.2 3.4
F.E. Contribution: 0.96 0.94 0.84 0.56 0.8
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.38 0.16 0.74 0.05 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.79 0.72 0.63 0.40





RealEstLns CILns CrCdLns OthConsLns OthLns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WV 55.15∗∗∗ 0.11 6.10∗ 3.97∗∗ 0.61
(3.97) (1.90) (3.48) (1.81) (1.17)
US* 38.45∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 12.56∗∗∗ 5.24∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗
(1.19) (0.57) (1.05) (0.54) (0.35)
Class: Nonmember −26.60∗∗∗ −0.88 9.99∗ 3.92 1.51
(6.93) (3.32) (6.06) (3.15) (2.03)
Class: State Member −3.23∗∗∗ −0.51∗ −7.21∗∗∗ −0.34 0.67∗∗∗
(0.58) (0.28) (0.51) (0.27) (0.17)
Class: Savings Bank −6.07 0.08 1.65 0.43 −1.42
(7.01) (3.36) (6.14) (3.19) (2.06)
Class: Savings Assoc. −14.99∗∗∗ −2.04∗∗∗ 7.48∗∗∗ −2.18∗∗∗ −2.92∗∗∗
(1.38) (0.66) (1.21) (0.63) (0.40)
Owned: Multi-BHC −20.12∗∗∗ 7.60∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 0.24 2.83∗∗∗
(1.10) (0.53) (0.96) (0.50) (0.32)
Owned: Single-BHC 1.03 9.97∗∗∗ −4.18∗∗∗ −1.63∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗
(1.06) (0.51) (0.93) (0.48) (0.31)
Reg. by FDIC 33.49∗∗∗ −3.08 −10.18∗ −3.41 −2.68
(6.90) (3.30) (6.04) (3.14) (2.02)
Age: 0-10 yrs 11.42∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ −9.01∗∗∗ 0.73∗ 1.95∗∗∗
(0.82) (0.39) (0.72) (0.37) (0.24)
Age: 10-20 yrs −4.19∗∗∗ 6.94∗∗∗ −5.67∗∗∗ 7.19∗∗∗ −1.29∗∗∗
(0.78) (0.38) (0.69) (0.36) (0.23)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits −1.23∗∗∗ −1.24∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03)
Market Size: Share of States 0.35∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.09∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
WV coef. for base regression: 56 8.2 0.066 4 2
US* coef. for base regression: 27 12 4.6 4.6 7.1
F.E. Contribution: 0.83 0.9 0.45 0.79 0.91
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.79 0.26 0.43 0.79





Sct ChBal Frepo OthAssets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WV 26.58∗∗∗ 1.29 0.84 6.53∗∗∗
(3.42) (1.89) (1.12) (0.99)
US* 29.19∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 5.70∗∗∗
(1.03) (0.57) (0.34) (0.30)
Class: Nonmember 11.98∗∗ 2.77 −0.18 −2.30
(5.97) (3.29) (1.96) (1.72)
Class: State Member 1.03∗∗ 7.23∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.28) (0.17) (0.15)
Class: Savings Bank 8.81 −0.11 −0.70 −2.85
(6.05) (3.34) (1.98) (1.74)
Class: Savings Assoc. 16.51∗∗∗ 3.55∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −3.94∗∗∗
(1.19) (0.66) (0.39) (0.34)
Owned: Multi-BHC −6.11∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗
(0.95) (0.52) (0.31) (0.27)
Owned: Single-BHC −6.42∗∗∗ −1.64∗∗∗ −0.38 1.28∗∗∗
(0.91) (0.50) (0.30) (0.26)
Reg. by FDIC −17.10∗∗∗ 0.84 0.12 1.72
(5.95) (3.28) (1.95) (1.71)
Age: 0-10 yrs −12.61∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.39) (0.23) (0.20)
Age: 10-20 yrs 0.35 −2.10∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗ −1.05∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.37) (0.22) (0.19)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits −0.38∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Market Size: Share of States 0.21∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
WV coef. for base regression: 18 4.3 0.39 7.4
WV coef. for base regression: 21 11 2.4 11
F.E. Contribution: 0.95 0.8 0.49 0.85
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.49 0.15 0.78 0.63
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.79 0.45 0.93
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total assets.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Real Estate Loans
Dependent Variable:
ConstDev Agric 1-4FamRes 5+FamRes NResNFarm Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WV 5.11∗∗∗ −0.02 34.18∗∗∗ 4.54∗∗∗ 14.54∗∗∗ 0.17
(0.62) (0.64) (2.19) (1.51) (1.71) (0.12)
US* 4.58∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 23.70∗∗∗ 3.97∗∗∗ 15.96∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23) (0.78) (0.54) (0.61) (0.04)
Class: Nonmember 1.78∗ 0.53 −9.08∗∗∗ −0.59 7.09∗∗∗ −0.12
(0.97) (1.01) (3.43) (2.37) (2.68) (0.18)
Class: State Member 1.34∗∗∗ −0.09 −0.78∗ 0.24 2.56∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.46) (0.32) (0.36) (0.02)
Class: Savings Bank −0.33 −2.05∗∗ 1.01 11.72∗∗∗ 3.75 −0.22
(0.99) (1.02) (3.48) (2.40) (2.72) (0.18)
Class: Savings Assoc. −1.32∗∗∗ −0.43 12.08∗∗∗ −0.60 −2.76∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗
(0.28) (0.29) (0.99) (0.68) (0.77) (0.05)
Owned: Multi-BHC −1.68∗∗∗ −0.16 −8.45∗∗∗ −1.23∗∗ −4.41∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.72) (0.49) (0.56) (0.04)
Owned: Single-BHC −0.50∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ −4.30∗∗∗ −2.12∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ −0.04
(0.18) (0.19) (0.65) (0.45) (0.51) (0.03)
Reg. by FDIC −0.23 0.42 7.14∗∗ 2.77 −0.55 0.03
(0.97) (1.00) (3.40) (2.35) (2.66) (0.18)
Age: 0-10 yrs −0.68∗∗∗ −1.30∗∗∗ 7.98∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ −3.22∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.58) (0.40) (0.45) (0.03)
Age: 10-20 yrs 0.63∗∗∗ −1.69∗∗∗ −3.95∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.55) (0.38) (0.43) (0.03)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Dep. −0.07∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.004)
Market Size: Share of States 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.001)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.07∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.001)
WV coef. for base regression: 5.6 0.38 29 4 20 0
US* coef. for base regression: 3 0.97 19 3.9 13 0.19
F.E. Contribution: 0.73 0.36 0.88 0.52 0.73 0.33
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.52 0.61
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.23 0.79 0.38 0.78 0.28
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total assets.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.7: Income: Interest and Noninterest
Dependent Variable:
i.RE i.CI i.Cons i.OthLns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WV 56.39∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗ 15.75∗∗∗ 0.96
(4.13) (1.71) (4.27) (1.45)
US* 39.66∗∗∗ 6.37∗∗∗ 23.61∗∗∗ 2.84∗∗∗
(1.24) (0.51) (1.28) (0.44)
Class: Nonmember −26.01∗∗∗ −1.77 10.03 −0.94
(7.21) (2.98) (7.44) (2.52)
Class: State Member −4.05∗∗∗ −0.74∗∗∗ −11.30∗∗∗ −0.90∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.25) (0.63) (0.21)
Class: Savings Bank −5.47 −1.44 −2.59 −3.36
(7.30) (3.02) (7.53) (2.55)
Class: Savings Assoc. −17.39∗∗∗ −7.33∗∗∗ 1.83 −2.01∗∗∗
(1.43) (0.59) (1.48) (0.50)
Owned: Multi-BHC −20.82∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗
(1.15) (0.47) (1.18) (0.40)
Owned: Single-BHC −1.08 6.42∗∗∗ −8.15∗∗∗ 0.35
(1.10) (0.46) (1.14) (0.39)
Reg. by FDIC 33.58∗∗∗ −1.59 −12.82∗ 0.06
(7.18) (2.97) (7.41) (2.51)
Age: 0-10 yrs 12.47∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗ −11.10∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗
(0.86) (0.35) (0.88) (0.30)
Age: 10-20 yrs −3.64∗∗∗ 5.86∗∗∗ −0.04 −2.06∗∗∗
(0.82) (0.34) (0.84) (0.29)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits −1.11∗∗∗ −1.15∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03)
Market Size: Share of States 0.36∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.17∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
WV coef. for base regression: 56 8.1 4.4 0.084
US* coef. for base regression: 25 9.2 12 5.1
F.E. Contribution: 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.67
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.76 0.49 0.63
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total revenue.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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WV 16.71∗∗∗ 1.25 3.28
(2.64) (0.88) (3.68)
US* 16.94∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 6.91∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.26) (1.11)
Class: Nonmember 11.09∗∗ −0.02 7.23
(4.60) (1.53) (6.42)
Class: State Member −0.39 0.96∗∗∗ 17.45∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.13) (0.54)
Class: Savings Bank 11.32∗∗ −0.24 2.33
(4.66) (1.55) (6.50)
Class: Savings Assoc. 17.36∗∗∗ −2.53∗∗∗ 12.02∗∗∗
(0.91) (0.30) (1.28)
Owned: Multi-BHC −5.91∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 15.85∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.24) (1.02)
Owned: Single-BHC −5.33∗∗∗ −0.20 7.59∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.23) (0.98)
Reg. by FDIC −14.10∗∗∗ −0.57 −3.50
(4.58) (1.52) (6.39)
Age: 0-10 yrs −8.60∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ −0.66
(0.55) (0.18) (0.76)
Age: 10-20 yrs 5.03∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ −5.88∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.17) (0.73)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits 0.13∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.02) (0.08)
Market Size: Share of States 0.14∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
WV coef. for base regression: 10 1.1 19
US* coef. for base regression: 12 4.7 31
F.E. Contribution: 0.85 0.72 0.91
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.92 0.56 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.78 0.88
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total revenue.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.8: Noninterest Income
Dependent Variable:
FiducAcvt DepAcctsChg Trad Invest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WV −1.26 4.84∗∗∗ −0.01 −1.27
(2.62) (0.88) (0.59) (0.80)
US* −0.91 3.42∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.37
(0.79) (0.27) (0.18) (0.24)
Class: Nonmember 4.23 −0.76 −0.16 3.33∗∗
(4.57) (1.54) (1.03) (1.39)
Class: State Member 14.28∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12)
Class: Savings Bank 2.32 −0.84 −0.91 2.13
(4.62) (1.56) (1.05) (1.41)
Class: Savings Assoc. 6.73∗∗∗ −0.59∗ −1.09∗∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗
(0.91) (0.31) (0.21) (0.28)
Owned: Multi-BHC 5.28∗∗∗ −0.24 2.12∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.73) (0.24) (0.16) (0.22)
Owned: Single-BHC −3.07∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 0.16 0.55∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21)
Reg. by FDIC −0.61 0.17 0.24 −1.13
(4.55) (1.53) (1.03) (1.39)
Age: 0-10 yrs −5.39∗∗∗ −2.03∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.18) (0.12) (0.17)
Age: 10-20 yrs −3.90∗∗∗ −1.56∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.17) (0.12) (0.16)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits −0.37∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Market Size: Share of States −0.21∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
Market Size: Share of Pop. 0.20∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
WV coef. for base regression: 2.8 5.9 0.036 0.81
US* coef. for base regression: 4.5 4.9 3.7 2.3
F.E. Contribution: 0.4 0.85 0.45 0.73
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.92 0.15 0.96 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.77 0.89 0.50





ServFees Securiz SalesAssets OthNonii
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WV 0.16 −0.45∗∗∗ 1.98∗ −0.70
(0.50) (0.16) (1.19) (2.17)
US* 1.24∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗
(0.15) (0.05) (0.36) (0.65)
Class: Nonmember 0.44 0.43 −7.22∗∗∗ 6.93∗
(0.88) (0.28) (2.08) (3.78)
Class: State Member −0.20∗∗∗ 0.03 −1.00∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.02) (0.18) (0.32)
Class: Savings Bank 0.16 0.29 −7.03∗∗∗ 6.21
(0.89) (0.28) (2.11) (3.83)
Class: Savings Assoc. −0.26 0.46∗∗∗ 0.47 7.41∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.06) (0.41) (0.75)
Owned: Multi-BHC −0.28∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗ 9.01∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.04) (0.33) (0.60)
Owned: Single-BHC 0.32∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 7.33∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.04) (0.32) (0.58)
Reg. by FDIC −0.90 −0.16 6.91∗∗∗ −8.02∗∗
(0.88) (0.28) (2.07) (3.76)
Age: 0-10 yrs 0.02 0.03 0.78∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.03) (0.25) (0.45)
Age: 10-20 yrs 0.18∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.36 0.08
(0.10) (0.03) (0.24) (0.43)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits 0.07∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.004) (0.03) (0.05)
Market Size: Share of States 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.01) (0.02)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.01) (0.02)
WV coef. for base regression: 0.052 0 2.1 7.2
US* coef. for base regression: 1.4 0.064 1.5 13
F.E. Contribution: 0.91 0.27 0.63 0.91
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.00 0.21 0.76 0.10
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.05 0.19 0.78
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total revenue.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.9: Expenses: Interest and Noninterest
Dependent Variable:
i.ExpDep i.ExpOth nonint.Sal nonint.As nonint.Oth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WV 12.49∗∗∗ 5.23∗∗∗ 41.50∗∗∗ 10.43∗∗∗ 30.35∗∗∗
(1.60) (1.25) (2.93) (1.15) (3.26)
US* 11.35∗∗∗ 4.46∗∗∗ 42.94∗∗∗ 8.58∗∗∗ 32.66∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.38) (0.88) (0.35) (0.98)
Class: Nonmember −4.27 −1.23 −15.14∗∗∗ −4.56∗∗ 25.20∗∗∗
(2.79) (2.18) (5.11) (2.01) (5.68)
Class: State Member −0.55∗∗ −2.33∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ −3.75∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.18) (0.43) (0.17) (0.48)
Class: Savings Bank 0.67 1.68 −16.63∗∗∗ −3.77∗ 18.04∗∗∗
(2.82) (2.21) (5.17) (2.03) (5.75)
Class: Savings Assoc. −3.94∗∗∗ −2.99∗∗∗ −9.25∗∗∗ −3.28∗∗∗ 19.47∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.43) (1.02) (0.40) (1.13)
Owned: Multi-BHC −2.87∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ −10.97∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗ 13.11∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.35) (0.81) (0.32) (0.90)
Owned: Single-BHC −2.31∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗ 0.08 1.14∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗
(0.43) (0.33) (0.78) (0.31) (0.87)
Reg. by FDIC 4.72∗ −0.26 19.25∗∗∗ 5.17∗∗∗ −28.88∗∗∗
(2.78) (2.17) (5.09) (2.00) (5.66)
Age: 0-10 yrs 6.93∗∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗ −8.15∗∗∗ −1.33∗∗∗ −0.50
(0.33) (0.26) (0.61) (0.24) (0.68)
Age: 10-20 yrs 4.84∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ −10.86∗∗∗ −2.67∗∗∗ 8.01∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.25) (0.58) (0.23) (0.64)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits −0.21∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Market Size: Share of States 0.06∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Market Size: Share of Pop. −0.09∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.19∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
WV coef. for base regression: 11 3.3 43 11 31
US* coef. for base regression: 6.8 5.8 43 9.8 35
F.E. Contribution: 0.75 0.83 0.97 0.96 0.96
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.37 0.52 0.48 0.02 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.70 0.95 0.87 0.92
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total expenses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.10: Interest Expenses
Dependent Variable:
TrAcct SavAcct TmDep efrepp USTrea i.ExpOth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WV 1.65∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗ 8.57∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.99) (1.14) (0.24) (0.81) (0.65)
US* 0.86∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ 6.78∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.30) (0.34) (0.07) (0.24) (0.20)
Class: Nonmember −0.90∗∗∗ 3.19∗ −6.56∗∗∗ 0.68 −0.04 −1.87
(0.31) (1.72) (2.00) (0.42) (1.41) (1.14)
Class: State Member −0.08∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ 0.30∗ −0.04 −0.93∗∗∗ −1.36∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.15) (0.17) (0.04) (0.12) (0.10)
Class: Savings Bank −0.98∗∗∗ 5.66∗∗∗ −4.00∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 3.10∗∗ −2.29∗∗
(0.31) (1.74) (2.02) (0.43) (1.43) (1.15)
Class: Savings Assoc. 0.20∗∗∗ −0.30 −3.84∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −1.49∗∗∗ −1.31∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.34) (0.40) (0.08) (0.28) (0.23)
Owned: Multi-BHC −0.28∗∗∗ 0.48∗ −3.08∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.27) (0.32) (0.07) (0.22) (0.18)
Owned: Single-BHC −0.20∗∗∗ 0.11 −2.22∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.20 −0.60∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.26) (0.30) (0.06) (0.22) (0.17)
Reg. by FDIC 0.81∗∗∗ −3.88∗∗ 7.79∗∗∗ −0.67 −0.41 0.82
(0.31) (1.71) (1.99) (0.42) (1.41) (1.13)
Age: 0-10 yrs −0.28∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 4.20∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.20) (0.24) (0.05) (0.17) (0.14)
Age: 10-20 yrs 0.39∗∗∗ 3.67∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ −0.04 0.60∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.04) (0.19) (0.23) (0.05) (0.16) (0.13)
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits 0.12∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Market Size: Share of States −0.03∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.005)
Market Size: Share of Pop. 0.01∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.005)
WV coef. for base regression: 1.3 2.3 7 1.1 1.9 0.31
US* coef. for base regression: 0.67 3 3.2 0.38 3.6 1.7
F.E. Contribution: 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.77 0.9 0.57
F-test: WV = US* (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.79 0.55
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.54 0.52 0.23 0.67 0.53
Note: Sample size = 5,777. Dependent variables are shares of total expenses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 2.13: Share of Real Estate Loans by State of Bank HQ, 2017
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Figure 2.14: Mixed-effects Model Estimates of Real Estate Loan Shares, 2017
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Figure 2.15: Model Errors in Real Estate Loan Shares, 2017
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Figure 2.16: Estimated Fixed- and Random-Effects for Real Estate Loans, 2017
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Figure 2.17: Decomposition of Random Effects for Real Estate Loans, 2017
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Chapter 3
A State-Level Analysis of the Cost
Efficiency of U.S. Community Banks
3.1 Introduction
This research generates aggregate cost efficiency measures for U.S. state community banking
(CBs) markets using data from 2013 to 2018. This aggregate measure is estimated based on the
annual weighted-deposit average estimates of the cost efficiency of U.S. community banks (CBs)
operating in each state in the United States, which is a contribution of this study. This analysis
is motivated by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which
drastically changed the market composition of the U.S. banking industry as it allowed banks to
operate in more than one state and led to a faster consolidation of the industry.
Given the differences in the timing of adoption of this regulation across U.S. states, it is possible
that the asymmetric implementation of this policy can explain differences in performance across
banks in different states.1 This study explores if and where such differences emerge geographically
when comparing the U.S. state local banking markets in one dimension, cost efficiency. Assaf et al.
(2019) emphasize the importance of studying the cost efficiency of banks. Their results find that a
1Moreover, even though this regulation allowed banks to operate in more than one state, it also allowed states to
impose state-specific anti-competitive restrictions related to the entry of out-of-state banks (Johnson and Rice, 2008).
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higher level of cost efficiency lowers the probability of bank failure during downturns in economic
activity; hence, their results show that a bank’s cost efficiency can be associated with its ability to
provide its customers liquidity services.
This paper also contributes to the literature by updating the cost efficiency measures of almost
two decades ago from Berger and Mester (1997). Following the methodology from Assaf et al.
(2019), a bank’s cost efficiency is estimated using the parametric cost frontier distribution-free
approach (DFA) to a panel micro U.S. banking data set. The parametric methodology is chosen
over the nonparametric due to its ability to decompose the difference between a bank’s current and
predicted optimal performance in two components, the random error term and the firm-specific
inefficiency component.
The FDIC defines CBs as banks which (1) the business model focuses on transforming core
deposits into loans, (2) operates in three or fewer states and two or fewer MSAs, and (3) fall
under the indexed size threshold of one billion dollars in total assets (FDIC, 2012). The focus on
CBs improves the estimation of the applied methodology. This sample selection criterion better
accommodates the strong output homogeneity assumption imposed by the methodology applied
and, combined with better data availability, reduces problems with outliers, which allows for lower
winsorization adjustments. The study of community banks (CBs) is specially important given
that they compose 91% of all U.S. banks and their specialization in providing relationship loans
to financially constrained borrowers. Moreover, it also makes the findings of this paper more
applicable to states which economies are more dependent on small businesses’ and/or that have
larger share of non-metropolitan areas.
This research finds that U.S. banks’ ability to minimize cost, given output and market input
prices, when compared to the best performing bank in that period has deteriorated in the past two
decades.2 The average relative current cost-efficiency of CBs has fallen by at least 30%. The
preferred specification of this study reports that CBs are, on average, 45.6% efficient relative to the
2One may be worried about the differences in bank sample between this study and Berger and Mester (1997).
However, given that both papers find that geographical expansion is associated with lower levels of bank performance,
the fact that this research only considers community banks can actually underestimate the differences in performance
across both sample periods.
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most efficient CB if facing the same environmental conditions. This deterioration in relative cost
efficiency suggests subsequent work should explore what has impacted banks’ ability to perform
as well as the best performing bank if facing the same environmental conditions. As a simple
first step to investigate the current determinants of a bank’s cost efficiency, a micro banking OLS
regression is applied to investigate which regional and banking characteristics are associated with
higher performance levels. Despite providing suggestive results, this methodology allows for a
comparison with the results provided by Berger and Mester (1997).
The relationships between several variables have changed in since the mid-1990s. Younger,
independent (not owned by a bank holding company (BHC)), and holding more loans in its balance
sheet are now positively associated with better cost minimization. In terms of regulator agency,
banks regulated by the FDIC, relative to OCC-regulated banks, are associated with better cost-
efficiency levels. Customer characteristics, such as wealthier clients and clients living in states
more dependent on agriculture, are also positively related to bank performance. The reasoning
behind these results are further elaborated in Results Section. However, it is important to highlight
that the regression analysis reports that banking and regional characteristics explain only 19.2% of
the variation in the cost efficiency of CBs; however, even though small, this is significantly higher
than the 7% reported by Berger and Mester (1997) for all U.S. banks.
Despite mainly fitting into the banking literature, this article further emphasizes the need to
further investigate the interaction between regional financial markets and regional economic out-
comes. Using a micro-macro approach, this paper is the first to generate cost efficiency estimates
for U.S. state banking markets. A micro-macro approach refers to the process of using micro-level
banking data to generate banking markets aggregate measures. The cost efficiency of CB markets
is found to be heterogeneous across U.S. states, as top performing states are found to be on average
nearly twice as efficient as the least efficient ones.
Lastly, through the analysis of pairwise correlations, this study also takes a first step towards
investigating if the variation in the cost efficiency of banking markets is linked to differences
in socioeconomic outcomes across U.S. states. Motivated by results from the literature papers
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discussed in Section 3.2.2, the socioeconomic variables considered in analysis are the growth rate
of real income per capita and labor market outcomes. The results show the presence of a significant
negative correlation between the cost efficiency of a state’s CB market with its unemployment and
job destruction rates. No significant relationship is not found between banking market performance
and real income growth. These are findings my future research will continue to investigate using a
larger sample period and more sophisticated econometric models.
3.2 Literature Review
This section is split into two parts. First, the paper briefly describes the literature on the cost-
efficiency of U.S. banks, while the second subsection summarizes the literature that studies the
relationship between banking activity and regional economic outcomes.
3.2.1 Cost Efficiency: Banking Application
The U.S. banking cost efficiency literature had its peak in the 1990s when several authors investi-
gated the most appropriate methodology to estimate the the efficiency of U.S. banks; these include
Berger and DeYoung (1997), Mitchell and Onvural (1996), Berger and Humphrey (1997), Hughes
et al. (1996), among others. Berger and Mester (1997) provide a comprehensive summary of this
literature. Their paper compare and contrast the cost efficiency of U.S. banks given the use of
different estimation approaches.
The authors report two main cost frontier methodologies have been applied, parametric and
nonparametric cost frontier estimation approaches. There are trade-offs between these approaches,
but the parametric estimation’s main advantage is its ability to disentangle the composite error,
the difference between a firm’s current and optimal performance, in two components: the random
error term and the firm-specific inefficiency component. The methodology section will further
describe the differences between these two frontier estimation techniques. Moreover, despite the
large number of papers publish on this topic in the 1990s, the large majority of studies using cost
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efficiency since then have focused on studying European banking systems, countries, and regions.
Given differences in institutional composition, regulation, and culture, these papers will not report
non-US results. A list of the papers for this European banking literature can be provided upon
request.
However, a recent study from Assaf et al. (2019) brought attention again to this performance
measure when applied to U.S. banks. The authors report the existence of a positive link between
the cost efficiency of U.S. banks and their ability to continue to provide services to its customers
during recessions. Motivated by this finding, this research estimates the core cost efficiency of
U.S. community banks from 2013 to 2018. The reason for the selection of this specific 6-year
period is twofold: (1) Assaf et al. (2019) estimate the cost-efficiency of banks using data from the
2007-08 Great Recession, which hints at the need for evaluation of this measure in a more recent
period; and (2) the length of this period is chosen to optimize the estimation of the cost efficiency
of banks. Despite such contribution to the literature, this study is not the first to connect banking
activity with regional economic outcomes.
3.2.2 The Importance of Regional Banking
The study of the relationship between the U.S. banking industry with regional socioeconomic
outcomes deserves attention given the important roles bank have in the U.S. economy. Given that
we live in a world of imperfect information, banks efficiently solve asymmetric information issues
between borrowers and savers (Flannery, 1982). This is accomplished through the brokerage, and
qualitative asset transformation (QAT) functions they perform.
The brokerage function refers to the comparative advantage banks have in dealing with pre-
contract adverse selection and post-contract moral hazard issues. This function, presumably, leads
to the allocation of credit to its highest and best use. Moreover, its QAT function increases the
probability of finding a counterpart for any transaction. This is done through asset transformations
related to maturity, divisibility, risk of default, and exchange rate risks. Given the important roles
of banks in reducing transaction and intermediation costs, their absence can generate liquidity
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constraint problems for local businesses and households, which can have a negative impact on
local economic growth.3
In addition to differences in the presence of banks across states, differences in financial behav-
ior of banks operating in a state can also impact regional economic growth. According to Samolyk
(1994), Khan and Ozel (2016), and Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) differences across banks’ loan
portfolio information can impact growth and labor market outcomes across different geographical
regions, especially of states/counties facing high demand for loans. In addition, Carpenter et al.
(2020) finds that the share of locally owned banks is positively related to business births and deaths
in rural counties; but, the inverse effect is reported for metropolitan areas.
Given that a banks financial behavior can also be impacted by changes in regulation, these
changes also deserve attention here. Danisewicz et al. (2018) emphasize that increasing the regu-
latory burden over local banks has harmed income growth and the number of establishments while
also increasing unemployment across U.S. counties.4 Furthermore, Berger et al. (2020) report that
bank deregulation leads to higher credit availability to unconstrained firms but limits the access of
constrained ones (firms more dependent on relationship loans).
The results reported by Barth et al. (2016) and Minuci and Schuh (2021) further emphasize the
presence of differences in bank performance and composition across U.S. state banking markets.
For instance, Barth et al. (2016) show that the returns on assets (ROA) of banks during the Great
Recession of 2007 was not uniform across banks headquartered (HQ) in different states. Moreover,
Minuci and Schuh (2021), using more recent data, report that such differences are also found when
analyzing the current investment strategy of banks in different state markets.
Table 3.1’s max. and min. columns emphasize the large yearly variation of banking charac-
teristics across U.S. states from 2013 to 2018. Differences in state banking market characteristics
are noted across the board in terms of size (number of branches or offices per bank), bank com-
position (represented by the share of banks which are CBs and the share of deposits they hold),
bank investment strategy (represented by the share of loans to assets ratio), and market concentra-
3For instance; loan prices would rise as we would observe an adverse shock in the supply of loans.
4These regulatory changes are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation.
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tion (reported through the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of bank state deposits). Combined with
the commonly known differences in socioeconomic outcomes across states, these factors suggest
further exploration between regional banking markets and regional outcomes is needed.
In summary, according to the regional banking literature, bank type and performance can im-
pact economic activity in the areas they operate. Moreover, since the composition and performance
of banks operating across different U.S. states are not uniform, this study takes a step towards fur-
ther evaluating the relationship between banking markets’ performance and regional outcomes by
estimating a more sophisticated performance measure, cost efficiency, using a micro-macro ap-
proach to generate a comprehensive measure that can evaluate the performance of a state local
banking market.
3.3 Data
This study will study the core cost efficiency of U.S. banks from 2013 to 2018. The reason for
the selection of this specific 6-year period is twofold: (1) Assaf et al. (2019) estimate the cost-
efficiency of banks using data from the 2007-08 Great Recession, which hints at the need for
evaluation of this measure in a more recent period; and (2) the length of this period is chosen to
optimize the estimation of the cost efficiency of banks.5 Moreover, several data sources were used
to evaluate the research question proposed in this article.
Data for state-level socioeconomic characteristics come from a combination of the Census, for
population data, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for employment data. These characteristics
are reported yearly.
Banks, in this study, are defined as all financial institutions which report to the FDIC. Banking
data comes from three sources. Consolidated banking data comes from the Call Report Data and
Summary of Depository Institutions. These are quarterly unbalanced time series data, which con-
tains information about the balance sheet and income statement of these institutions.6 I exclude
5This will be further explained in the Methodology section.
6Income statement variables are properly annualized when necessary.
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foreign banks due to lower data availability. Moreover, branch-level data is reported yearly and
contains information on the location and specialization of the branches, the regulator, and the type
of each bank.7 All variables adjusted for inflation with a base year of 2018.
3.4 Methodology
From a neoclassical producer theory perspective, a necessary condition for a firm to be profit-
maximizing is to minimize cost. In this framework, a firm will choose the output level that max-
imizes profit, assuming it will choose the input bundle that minimizes the cost of producing that
output level at current input prices.
In a banking application, since their business model involves using deposits to make loans, a
bank’s production cost depends on the expenses spent to gather such funds. A possible way to
evaluate a firm’s ability to minimize its cost of production is through the use of cost frontiers.
This methodology estimates the difference between a bank’s total cost and the minimized total
cost from the predicted optimized cost frontier, the composite error term. Several econometric
techniques can estimate the cost frontier and, hence, firms’ inefficiency.
3.4.1 Cost Efficiency Estimation for Banks
In a banking application, since the underlying technology of these firms’ production process is un-
observed, efficiency is generally defined relative to the best-practice bank in the industry. Hence,
the cost-efficiency of a bank is generally defined by the ratio between (1) the cost needed to pro-
duce the bank’s output if the bank was as efficient as the best-practice bank in the industry, given
that it was facing the same environmental conditions and input bundle prices, and (2) its current
production costs.
Methods applied to estimate the cost efficiency of U.S. banks varied in the 90s between para-
metric or nonparametric. Berger and Mester (1997) emphasize that the main advantage of paramet-
7This data is released yearly during the second quarter of the year.
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ric methods is that they consider input prices and, thus, capture both the technical and allocative
efficiency skills of a bank. Allocative efficiency is associated with not properly responding to rel-
ative prices when choosing bundles of inputs and outputs for production. Given that this research
is interested in these institutions’ economic optimization process, a parametric frontier estimation
is used.
Moreover, other technical differences between both methods deserve attention. For instance,
nonparametric models also have a stronger output homogeneity requirement when comparing per-
formance across banks. Despite not requiring an explicit definition of the cost function, a require-
ment of the parametric approach, the nonparametric approach cannot disentangle the composite
error term’s inefficiency and random error term components. Hence, it carries the risk of con-
fusing random deviations with deviations from the frontier. This, however, is achievable in the
parametric estimation by making explicit assumptions about their distributions.
Bauer and Hancock (1993) highlight concerns about the validity of setting distributional as-
sumptions for the distribution of the composite error term when investigating U.S. banks.8 Nonethe-
less, Berger (1993) report that these concerns are minimized if panel data is available since the
Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) becomes an option. In the DFA parametric estimation, one first
assumes that each bank has a core, or average, efficiency over the period under study. Such effi-
ciency can be set apart from its temporary fluctuations due to the assumption the model imposes
that such fluctuations average out to zero over time. For this assumption to hold, Berger and Mester
(1997) and DeYoung (1997) state that the selection of 6 years is optimal. This paper applies this
approach for the micro-level U.S. banking quarterly data set from 2013 to 2018.9
The methodological approach applied to estimate the cost efficiency of U.S. banks in this study
is the same used by Assaf et al. (2019). Thus, the cost function is defined to be dependent on the
vector w of given input prices, q of given output quantities, and the composite error. The composite
error term can then be decomposed between the inefficiency component, u, and a random error
8Earlier research commonly assumed the composite error term followed a half-normal distribution.
9As a robustness check, the cost efficiency of banks estimated in this study is also estimated using a period of 5,
5.5, 6, 6.5, and 7 years. The results are strongly robust and can be provided upon request.
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term, ε . In a banking application, the vectors z and υ are also included to control for potential
scale bias and environmental factors, respectively. Moreover, note that in this case, the vector of
input quantities can be omitted in the estimation process.10
Therefore, the total short-run cost function of a CB at time t, where t represents quarterly
frequency, can be written as:
Cit = F(wit ,qit ,zit ,υit ,uit ,εit), (3.1)






exp [ĉ(wi,qi,zi,υi)]× exp [ln ûmin]




with Êi ∈ (0,1], (3.2)
where,
ˆumin = min{ûi1, ûi2, ..., ûN}
with N referring to the number of CBs in the data set. In this case, the subscript t is omitted since
this methodology assumes that the core cost efficiency of a bank is time invariant as it is estimated
by averaging the inefficient components of a bank across all t.
The estimation considering all banks is not reported in this study since it does not accommodate
the strong output quality homogeneity assumption imposed by this approach. This sample selection
criterion is a technical contribution provided by this study.
3.4.1.1 Input Prices and Output Variables
Following Assaf et al. (2019), a bank’s total costs is calculated by the sum of interest and noninter-
est expenses. Its cost frontier is then estimated based on the output bundle chosen for production
given such input prices. The noninterest expenses considered are the price of labor (total personnel
expenses per full-time employee), w1, the price of physical capital (total operating and adminis-
trative expenses to total premises and fixed assets), w2, the price of purchased funds (total interest
10This can be derived by solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions from the economic cost minimization problem of a
bank provides the Conditional Factor Demand Function that I is a function of both w and q.
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expense subtracted by core deposits interest expenses per dollar of core deposit accounts), w3, and
the price of core deposits, w4. A bank’s output is calculated by the sum of one’s value of total con-
sumer loans, y1, commercial and industrial (C&I loans), y2, residential real estate, y3, commercial
real estate, y4 and other loans (total loans minus the four asset components above), y5.11
Moreover, z is composed of z1 and z2, which define the notional value of a bank’s off-balance
sheet activities and its level of financial equity capital, respectively.12 Lastly, υ accounts for the risk
exposure a bank faces, which is approximated here by the weighted average ratio of nonperforming
loans located in states a bank operates in (Berger and DeYoung (1997), Berger and Mester (1997),
Assaf et al. (2019)). The selection of output follows the arguments in favor of modern banking
theories presented by Assaf et al. (2019), in which banks intermediate deposits into loans and
also engage in off-balance sheet activities.13 Table 3.2 summarizes information on the variables
included in the cost estimation of CBs.
3.4.1.2 Cost Function Specification
As common in this approach, the inefficiency and random error terms are assumed to be multi-
plicatively separable from the cost function (Berger and Mester (1997), Assaf et al. (2019)). Thus,
for this study Equation 1 can be rewritten as:
lnCit = c(wit ,qit ,zit ,υit)+ lnuit + lnεit (3.3)
Furthermore, I opt for the Fourier-flexible functional form, which complements the standard
second-order translog function specification by adding Fourier trigonometric terms. Thus, in the
equation above the function c represents the natural log of the function F in Equation 3.1. Berger
11One may wonder whether the level of deposits a bank holds should be considered part of its output bundle since
they are a type of service provided by these institutions. However, the previous literature emphasizes that results tend
to stay robust independently of the inclusion of deposits as output. Despite following the literature reporting the main
results, I also re-run my analysis, including deposits as output as a robustness check. Results are fairly similar and
show a slightly higher cost-efficiency. These can be provided upon request.
12Equity directly affects the cost of providing an alternative to deposits as a funding source for loans. Interest paid
on debt is an expanse, but dividends paid are not. Nonetheless, raising equity is also more costly than raising deposits.
13Under these theories, securities are better thought of as inputs to the banking functions rather than outputs. This,
however, does not change the nature of the results presented in this study.
90
and Mester (1997) and Assaf et al. (2019) emphasize this to be the optimal functional choice for
the cost estimation of banks given its higher flexibility relative to the traditional translog approach.
Moreover, they argue this specification serves as a global approximation to virtually any cost or




















































































































[φnn′n′′ cos(xn + xn′+ xn′′)+ωnn′n′′ sin(xn + xn′+ xn′′)]
+ζ1 lnυ + lnu+ lnε.
(3.4)
I omit the subscripts i and t for easier visualization. However, this methodology estimates the
short-run total cost for each community bank, i, in each time period, t. The core inefficiency
component, u, is the only variable which is time invariant in this estimation as it determines the
core inefficiency component of bank i.
Two normalization techniques are introduced in Equation 3.4. First, I normalize total costs and
input prices by the average cost per dollar of core deposits to ensure linear homogeneity. This
ensures that total costs move proportionally to changes in the cost of all input prices. Moreover,
the normalization of total costs, output quantities, and z1 by z2 ensures the comparability among
banks by further reducing the risk of scale bias on the regression results. The usual symmetry,
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homogeneity, and adding-up constraints are also imposed in the estimation procedure. These are
standard normalization procedures implemented in banking applications (Assaf et al., 2019).
Lastly, two winsorizing approaches, common to the literature, are implemented to reduce ex-
treme outliers’ impact on results. I winsorize by 10% of the end of each interval, [0,2π], of xn
to reduce approximation problems near the distribution endpoints.14. In addition, the literature
also highlights the possibility of outliers due to the inability of the model to completely purge out
the random error through averaging. As a response, previous papers winsorize the distribution of
banks’ estimated core inefficiency component at the 95th percentile. Given improvements in the
quality and quantity of data available for U.S. banks over the past two decades, I also generate
results using the 99th percentile winsorizing approach for comparison.
3.5 Results
To report the results clearly and concisely, this section is divided into three subsections. First, this
study explores the results related to estimating the cost efficiency of U.S. community banks at the
national level. Second, it explores potential banking and regional characteristics associated with
variation in such efficiency measurement. Lastly, a state-level analysis is conducted to evaluate the
variation in banking markets’ cost efficiency across U.S. states.
3.5.1 Bank-Level Cost Efficiency Results
As described in the Methodology section, based on the results from the GLS random-effects model
(Table 3.3) one can compute the predicted core cost efficiency, ui, for each bank i. The micro-level
cost efficiency estimation results are reported in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1.
The average cost efficiency across U.S. community banks ranges from 45.6 to 61.3%, depend-
ing on the winsorization approach. Results show that CBs’ performance is significantly lower than
14“The formula for xn is (0.2×π−µ×a+µ×variable), where [a,b] is the range of the variable being transformed
and µ = (0.9×2π−0.1×2π)/(b−a).” (Assaf et al., 2019)
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the 86.8% relative cost efficiency estimates from Berger and Mester (1997).15 It is important to
highlight that the comparison here is not in terms of the magnitude of cost efficiency, rather it il-
lustrates the lower ability to current banks to perform as well as the best performing bank if facing
the same environmental conditions. Furthermore, this agrees with Berger and Mester (2003), who
state that, in the early 2000s, bank cost productivity worsened while profit productivity increased.
This is worrisome given the important link between cost efficiency and banks’ ability to provide
their customers’ liquidity services.
Despite the common use of the literature of the 95th percentile, this study hereon opts for
analyzing only results based on 99th percentile estimates motivated by a couple of factors. First,
Table 3.4 highlights how this stronger winsorization adjustment seems to shift the first and second
moments of the distribution of U.S. banks’ cost efficiency by affecting the firms selected as the
best performing banks in the sample. Moreover, results provided using the 99th percentile do not
seem to suffer significant problems related to the presence of outliers discussed by the literature.16
This can potentially be due to the higher data accuracy of bank reports during more recent periods.
Hence, given the reasons above combined with a preference for staying closer to the reported data,
the 99th percentile winsorized results are preferred.
3.5.2 Empirical Investigation of Potential Correlates with Cost Efficiency
Similarly to Berger and Mester (1997), this paper conducts a bank-level linear regression to evalu-
ate the relationship between cost efficiency and banking and regional characteristics. In this study,
Êi, from Equation 3.2, is modeled to be explained by α0, a vector of bank characteristics, X̄i, a
vector of regional characteristics (which includes both banking market composition and socioeco-
nomic characteristics), Ḡi, a common constant across banks, and a random error term ei. Further-
more, given that the cost efficiency methodology used generates a time-invariant cost-efficiency
15Since Berger and Mester (1997)’s sample includes all U.S. banks, I re-estimated my methodology including all
banks as a robustness check. Despite not reporting the results in this paper, including noncommunity banks slightly
lowers U.S. banks’ average cost efficiency. These estimates can be provided upon request.
16The histogram of the distribution of the core inefficiency component of banks, ui, can be provided upon request.
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measure, time-varying variables included in the regression are six-year averages. Table 3.5 re-
ports the definition and descriptive statistics of the variables included in the empirical investigation
conducted based on Equation 3.5.
Due to cost efficiency being an estimated measure, and its standard error not being accounted
for in the following regression, the results presented are suggestive but not conclusive. Nonethe-
less, this regression still provides a contribution to the literature given that the comparison of its
results with the results from Berger and Mester (1997) can illustrate how the changes the bank-
ing industry has experienced in the past decades have affected the potential determinants of bank
performance.
Êi = α0 +α1X̄i +α2Ḡi + ei (3.5)
The results of this empirical investigation, including all CBs, from the first quarter of 2013
until the last quarter of 2018, are reported in column 1 of Table 3.6. Furthermore, given potential
concerns one may have about the accuracy of regional characteristics of banks operating in more
than one state, column 2 reports the results only for community banks that operate in a single state
(community single-market banks, CSMBs). CSMBs represent over 90% of all CBs. The results
are robust in the sense that the average relative cost efficiency changes by less than 1%.
The results suggest that policies related to reducing bank risk-taking behavior can be associated
with lower levels of cost-efficiency. This can be observed by the negative coefficient of the variable
indicating whether a bank is owned by a bank holding company (BHC). This result agrees with
the hypothesis that bank ownership expansion is correlated to increases bank risks (Goetz et al.,
2016). Younger banks also seem to be more cost-efficient.
Moreover, the preference for the asset portfolio allocation towards loans seems to have an
opposite impact relative to the preference for off-balance sheet activities.17 Given that loans are
perceived as more secure than off-balance sheet investment contracts, a bank preference for rel-
atively riskier assets, not surprisingly, is related to a higher probability of bank failure, which is
proxied by a bank’s cost efficiency. Thus, policies that encourage banks to hold safer assets can
17These include investments on derivative contracts, such as swaps, forwards, and futures.
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lead to better provision of liquidity services by CBs.
This study also finds that better bank performance is negatively correlated with bank geo-
graphic expansion, while some customer characteristics have the opposite effect. For instance,
results show that access to wealthier customers and a population economically dependent on agri-
culture, proxied by the share of branches specialized in agricultural type loans, lead to better cost-
efficiency. The latter can be seen as a proxy for regions where customers tend to be highly de-
pendent on agricultural markets, which seems to enable CBs to minimize its short-run production
costs better and, thus, better provide liquidity services to its customers.
Other bank characteristics explored include the bank’s main regulator. Banks regulated by the
FDIC relative to banks regulated by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) seem to face
a regulatory environment that enables banks to minimize short-run costs more efficiently. Another
type of bank regulator is the Federal Reserve, which is also positively correlated with CB’s cost-
efficiency. This is evaluated by including a dummy defining whether a CB is considered a savings
association. CBs considered savings associations are financial institutions which specialize in
relationship loans with a focus on real estate. Thus, regulatory differences could be one of the
reasons why savings institutions are, on average, more efficient than CBs. However, this paper
does not focus on the investigation of the specific regulatory differences that could be driving these
results.
Lastly, CB deposit concentration does not seem to be associated with variation in the cost effi-
ciency of CBs; however, this can be due to counterbalancing forces this variable suffers given that
an increase in CB’s state deposit HHI could mean an increase in its own share of state deposits or
an increase in another bank’s share. Nonetheless, when considering an increase in the concentra-
tion of deposits of all other banks, we note that rises in bank concentration tend to promote higher
bank efficiency. Share of deposits held by CBs in operating markets is not related to variations in
cost efficiency across CBs.
The correlates included in this analysis account for 19.2% of the variation in U.S. community
banks’ cost-efficiency. Despite these variables’ apparent low ability to explain a bank’s cost effi-
95
ciency, this result is significantly higher than the 7% reported by Berger and Mester (1997) for all
U.S. banks. This can potentially be attributed to two factors: (1) the many technological and data
reporting regulatory changes the banking industry has experienced in the last two decades, and (2)
the sample selection criterion used, which focus on a less heterogeneous sample of U.S. banks.
The results highlight the relevance of the re-evaluation of banks’ cost efficiency and its main
determinants after changes in regulation and banking markets’ composition. Bank ownership, age,
loan to asset ratio, and regulator are reported to have a different relationship with cost efficiency
relative to the early 1990s. Understanding which banking and customer characteristics are asso-
ciated with lower levels of cost-efficiency can help regulators identify banks underperforming; in
other words, banks that are not able to provide liquidity to its customers during periods of downturn
in economic activity. A natural follow-up question is whether this performance measure of cost
efficiency actually has significant affects on socioeconomic outcomes where such banks operate.
The next section takes a step towards answering to this question by using a micro-macro approach
to generate cost efficiency estimates for U.S. state banking markets.
3.5.3 State-Level Analysis
This paper contributes to the literature by being the first to generate an aggregate proxy for the
ability of community banking markets across U.S. states to provide liquidity to its clients during
recessions. To accomplish this aggregation task, this research defines the cost efficiency of a state
community banking market as the yearly weighted average of the core cost efficiency of the CBs
operating in the state. The weights are determined by the share of state CB deposits each CB holds.
This weighting scheme takes into consideration the market presence of each bank in a state. This






where αisy denotes the share of state deposits held by community bank i in state s of year y.
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This aggregation is done on an yearly basis due to the availability of the frequency of branch
deposits data. This section, however, focus only on evaluating the average cost efficiency of a
banking market from 2013 to 2018. Given that the core cost efficiency of a bank is time invariant,
the yearly variation of market performance would represent the impact of entry and exit of banks
in a market. Despite being an interesting question, such question is beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 3.2 reports the average of Êsy over the period under study using a heat map of U.S. states.
The figure shows heterogeneity across the ability of different state banking markets to provide
liquidity services to its customers. Nevada, Massachusetts, and Utah are the most efficient state
banking markets with an average cost efficiency of 61.27%. In contrast, the least efficient banking
markets, New Mexico, Alaska, and Arizona, are, on average, nearly half as efficient than the most
efficient states. Identifying which banking markets are not performing well can help regulators
identify areas more likely to suffer from community bank failures during a financial crisis. This
can allow regulators to be pro-active rather than reactive towards improving banking markets not
performing well.
Furthermore, this research also takes a first step towards investigating the determinants of cost
efficiency of CB markets across U.S. states. This is accomplished by generating and evaluating a
correlation matrix including the aggregate performance measures for community banking markets
and socioeconomic characteristics that can reflect economic growth, size of customer base, and
labor market outcomes. The results for this analysis can be observed in Table 3.7.
Motivated by Khan and Ozel (2016) and Duygan-Bump et al. (2015), this section evaluates
the linear relationship between the aggregate banking market performance with economic growth
and labor market outcomes. The data does not show a significant relationship between the level of
a CB market cost efficiency and the economic growth of its market. This could be explained by
the fact that Khan and Ozel (2016) use a simple aggregated measure of bank performance which
include all banks, and not simply community banks. Hence, the relationship they report could be
driven by the behavior of large multi-market banks (non-CBs).
CBs play a special role providing liquidity to small businesses and financially constrained
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borrowers (Berger et al., 2017). Thus, given the high relevance of small businesses to the U.S.
labor market, this research hypothesizes that better CB market performance is associated with
better labor market outcomes. As reported in Table 3.7, such hypothesis is indeed present in the
data. Furthermore, given the nature of CBs in serving financially constrained borrowers specially
during periods of downturn in economic activity, this study also explores the relationship of this
measure with the two other labor market measurements, the job destruction and the job creation
rate.
The job destruction rate represents the average rate of employment losses during this sample
period, while the job creation rate represents the average rate of employment gains. The data shows
that banking markets which perform at a higher cost efficiency level tend to experience lower job
destruction rates, which is not a surprise since job losses can be associated with lack of ability of
business to borrow to maintain current levels of production (Duygan-Bump et al., 2015).
As a simple robustness check to the pairwise correlation results provided is reported in column
[2]. For instance, this column shows the correlations of these labor market outcomes with the
presence, rather than the performance, of community banks in a state. The presence of CBs is
proxied by the the share of total state deposits held by community banks. Given that it does not
seem that the relationship between cost efficiency and the market presence of CBs can explain their
individual correlations with socioeconomic outcomes, these findings strengthen the motivation to
further investigate how the performance of community banking markets can impact socioeconomic
outcomes of their markets. Hence, my future research will continue to explore such findings using
more sophisticated models and larger sample periods.
Furthermore, future research should also investigate the performance and composition of bank-
ing markets individually.18 For instance, the variation of the cost efficiency of CBs within a state is
also an interesting study to be conducted. Nonetheless, the investigation of this result goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
18Minuci and Schuh (2021) provide a great example of the analysis of individual state banking markets by studying
the West Virginia banking industry.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of re-evaluating a banks’ performance and its determinants
after experiencing regulatory and market composition changes. Results show that the relative core
cost efficiency of banks has worsened in the past two decades. Moreover, we observe that the re-
lationship between cost-efficiency with bank age, regulator, and ownership remains significant but
now has the opposite sign. Lastly, customer characteristics also emerge as significantly correlated
with bank performance.
The relevance of a bank’s cost efficiency to regional economic activity comes from its asso-
ciation with its ability to provide liquidity services to its customers during recessions. Using a
weighted average of the cost efficiency of U.S. CBs, a micro-macro approach, this research is the
first to provide a proxy for the ability of banking markets across U.S. states to provide liquidity to
its clients in periods of downturn in economic activity. Nevada, Massachusetts, and Utah are the
most efficient U.S. state banking markets and are, on average, nearly twice as efficient as the least
efficient states (New Mexico, Alaska, and Arizona).
This discrepancy in the performance of CBs across state banking markets hints that a broader
investigation of CBs’ performance and their economic impact across different states deserves atten-
tion. To take a first attempt at answering to this question, using pairwise correlations, this research
reports that the aggregate cost efficiency of state community banking markets is associated with
both lower unemployment and job destruction rates. These results are the first step towards better
understanding the relationship between the performance of regional banking markets and regional
socioeconomic outcomes across U.S. states. Nonetheless, future work requires further exploration
of the causality channels connecting these variables.
There is promising work to be done towards improving the understanding of the determinants
of the cost efficiency of community banks and banking markets. For instance, at the regional level
future research involves evaluating the performance of community banking markets over time and
their main determinants. At the bank-level, a promising study involves exploring the factors that
99
have driven the variation of cost efficiency within and across CBs in the past decades. This study’s
results hint that better understanding such questions can help direct future regulations and improve
the ability of the financial system to positively impact socioeconomic outcomes across U.S. states.
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Table 3.1: Banking Market State-Level Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min.
N. of Banks Operating in State 600.63 494.24 2420.00 28.00
State avg. Branches by Bank 12.85 6.43 32.92 4.31
State Share of CBs 0.69 0.18 0.94 0.23
State Share of CBs’ Branches 0.29 0.17 0.69 0.05
State CBs Deposit Share 0.18 0.14 0.60 0.00
State Loans to Assets Ratio 0.59 0.07 0.71 0.21
State Bank HHI 303.31 240.31 1372.84 49.02
State CBs’ HHI 138.19 203.91 1027.37 9.10
N = 306.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Cost Function Main Variables
Bank Type: CBs
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
w1 : Price of Labor 69.552 28.634
w2 : Price of Physical Capital .504 26.878
w3 : Price of Purchased Funds .034 .230
w4 : Price of Core Deposits .010 .731
y1 : Consumer Loans .031 .049
y2 : C&I Loans .076 .064
y3 : Residential Real Estate .197 .150
y4 : Commercial Real Estate .262 .144
y5 : Other Loans .056 .087
z1 : Notion of Off-balance Sheet Act. .009 .093
z2 : Financial Equity Capital .119 .069
υ : State Share of Nonperforming Loans .013 .007
Observations 131,062
Number of banks 6,335
Max. number of periods per bank 24
Input price variables are reported in real dollars.
y# and z# are reported as share of total bank assets.
Input prices are flow variables and, thus, are annualized annualized.
For banks operating in more than one state, nonperforming loans represent the weighted
average of the share of nonporfoling loans across all the states it operates in.
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Table 3.3: Panel Bank-Level Regression Estimates
Total Costs
Price of Labor -23.78***
(1.959)
Price of Physical Capital -24.91***
(7.616)






Residential Real Estate -6.667**
(2.720)




Notion of Off-balance Sheet Act. 6.101***
(1.648)




St. Dev. of Residuals of ui .3296
St. Dev. of Residuals of εi .5337
Observations 131062
Number of banks 6335
Max. number of periods per bank 24
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Total costs and input prices are normalized by the average cost per dollar of
core deposits. Total costs, output quantities, and off-balance sheet activities
are normalized by financial equity capital. The second-order translog and
fourier-flexible terms are omited and can be provided upon request.
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Table 3.4: Cost Efficiency of U.S. Community Banks
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
95th winsorization .613 .170 .358 1.000
99th winsorization .456 .146 .187 1.000
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Figure 3.1: Histograms of Cost Efficiency of U.S. Community Banks
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Table 3.5: Banking and Regional Characteristics of U.S. Community Banks
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
X̄i : Banking Characteristics
Total Assets (in millions) 210.201 187.635
Owner: Bank Holding Company .788 .408
Age: Less than 10yrs old .179 .384
Age: 10 - 20 yrs old .106 .308
Age: Older than 20 yrs old .715 .452
Savings Association .119 .324
Relevance: Loans .608 .166
Relevance: Purchased Funds .103 .080
Relevance: Off-Balance Sheet Act. .016 .106
Share of Nonperforming Loans .015 .020
Regulator: FDIC .653 .470
Regulator: OCC .224 .411
Ḡi : Regional Characteristics
CBs Operating in 2 or 3 States .071 .256
Customer Market Size .027 .025
State Share of College Graduates .077 .038
State Share of Pop. 65yrs and older .142 .016
Branch Spec.: Agriculture .227 .419
State Share of CB Deposits .313 .178
State CBs’ HHI 230.477 287.293
State HHI (All Banks) 897.464 712.230
Observations 5,984
This analysis focus only on banks characterized as CBs consistently
throughout the 6 years of data this study considers.
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Table 3.6: Micro-Level Cost Efficiency of U.S. Banks
Sample: CBs CSMBs
Dep Var: CB’s Cost-Efficiency
Owner: Bank Holding Company -.0421*** -.0426***
(.00533) (.00551)
Age: Less than 10 Years Old .0349*** .0364***
(.00591) (.00625)
Age: 10 - 20 Years Old .0226*** .0259***
(.00631) (.00674)
Relevance: Loans .205*** .173***
(.0144) (.0152)
Relevance: Purchased Funds .158*** .151***
(.0297) (.0308)
Relevance: Off-Balance Sheet Act. -.137*** -.119***
(.0191) (.0221)
Share of Nonperforming Loans -.935*** -.902***
(.135) (.134)
Savings Association .0405*** .0444***
(.00727) (.00773)
Regulator: FDIC .00926*** .00801**
(.00350) (.00369)
Geo Expansion: Operates in 2 or 3 States -.0444***
(.00606)
Customer Market Size .602*** .731***
(.115) (.130)
State Share of Graduates .756*** .790***
(.0717) (.0757)
State Share of Pop. 65+ Years .540*** .568***
(.127) (.134)
Branch Spec.: Agriculture .0315*** .0328***
(.00441) (.00461)
State Share of CB Deposits .128*** .127***
(.0171) (.0183)
State Deposit HHI .163*** .159***
(.0337) (.0358)





Adjusted R2 .192 .176
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1 Bank size is not included since the cost efficiency estimation accounts for scale bias.
2 Prior to running the regression, HHI variables were multiplied by 10,000 as
traditionally done in the literature.
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Figure 3.2: State Weighted Average of Cost Efficiency of Community Banks by State
Note: Color bins indicate different quantiles of the distribution.
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Table 3.7: State-Level Correlation Matrix
State Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Market Cost Efficiency for CBs [1]
CB’s Share of State Deposits [2] -0.195*
Real Income per Capita Growth [3] 0.049 -0.161*
Unemployment Rate [4] -0.175* -0.2268* -0.187*
Job Destruction Rate [5] -0.208* 0.019 -0.264* 0.181*
Job Creation Rate [6] -0.068 -0.375* 0.131 0.162* 0.393*
All variables above represent the 6 years average of data from 2013 to 2018.
Sample size is 51.
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Table G.1: Data Description
Variable Name Unit Description
Explanatory Variables:
Bank Specific Variables:
WV dummy Equal to 1 if bank’s headquarter is located in West Vir-
ginia
US* dummy Equal to 1 if bank’s headquarter is located outside of
West Virginia
Class: Nonmember dummy Equal to 1 if bank is a commercial bank, state chartered,
Fed nonmember, and supervised by the FDIC or OCC.
Class: State Member dummy Equal to 1 if bank is a commercial or savings bank, state
chartered, Fed member, and supervised by the Federal
Reserve.
Class: Savings Bank dummy Equal to 1 if bank is a savings bank, state chartered, and
supervised by the FDIC.
Owned: Multi-BHC dummy Equal to 1 if bank is owned by a multi-bank holding
company.
Owned: Single-BHC dummy Equal to 1 if bank is equal to 1 if bank is owned by a
single-bank holding company.
Reg. by FDIC dummy Primarily Regulated by the FDIC.
Age: 0-10 yrs dummy Equal to 1 if bank has been insured by the FDIC for 10
or less years.
Age: 10-20 yrs dummy Equal to 1 if bank has been insured by the FDIC for
more than 10 but less than 20 years.
Bank Size: Nat. Share of Deposits bps Bank’s share of total national deposits.
Market Characteristics:
Market Size: Share of States bps Share of states banks operate in (counts DC as a state).
Market Size: Share of Pop. bps Share of national population in the bank’s main market
area. The market area of a bank includes all the states
in which the bank has branches located in.
Avg. Branch Dep. log dollars The log of the average branch deposits of the bank.
Dependent Variables:
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. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
Liabilities and Capital:
IntAccts bps Bank’s interest-bearing deposits in domestic and for-
eign offices as a share of the sum of the bank’s total
liabilities and total equity capital.
NonIntAccts bps Bank’s sum of total demand deposits and noninterest-
bearing time and savings deposits in domestic and for-
eign offices as a share of the sum of the bank’s total
liabilities and total equity capital.
Frepp bps Bank’s federal funds purchased and securities sold un-
der agreements to repurchase as a share of the sum of
the bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital.
OthBorFunds bps Bank’s other borrowed funds as a share of the sum of
the bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital..Other
borrowed funds exclude deposits, federal funds pur-
chased, securities sold under agreements to repurchase
in domestic offices of the bank, and trading liabilities.
OthLiab bps Bank’s other liabilities as a share of the sum of the
bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital. Other
liabilities include trading liabilities, subordinated debt,
liability on acceptances executed and outstanding, in-
terest and other expenses accrued and unpaid, and other
liabilities.
Capital bps Bank’s total equity capital as a share of the sum of the
bank’s total liabilities and total equity capital.
Deposits:
TransDep bps Bank’s transaction deposits as a share of the bank’s total
assets.
MMDAs bps Bank’s deposits from money market deposit accounts
(MMDAs) as a share of the bank’s total assets.
128
. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
OthSav bps Bank’s deposits from savings accounts excluding MM-
DAs as a share of the bank’s total assets.
TmDep0-250k bps Bank’s time deposits under $250,000 as a share of the
bank’s total assets.
TmDep250k bps Bank’s time deposits over or equal to $250,000 as a
share of the bank’s total assets.
Assets:
RealEstLns bps Bank’s real estate loans as a share of the bank’s total
assets.
CILns bps Bank’s commercial and industrial loans as a share of
the bank’s total assets.
CrCdLns bps Bank’s credit card loans as a share of the bank’s total
assets.
OthConsLns bps Bank’s other consumer loans as a share of the bank’s
total assets. Other loans represent all consumer loans
minus credit card loans.
OthLns bps Bank’s other loans as a share of the bank’s total assets.
Sct bps Bank’s securities as a share of the bank’s total assets.
ChBal bps Bank’s cash & balances due from depository institu-
tions as a share of the bank’s total assets.
Frepo bps Bank’s federal funds sold and reverse repurchase as a
share of the bank’s total assets.
OthAssets bps Bank’s other assets as a share of the bank’s total assets.
Other assets include bank premises and fixed assets, di-
rect and indirect investments in real estate, trading ac-
count assets, intangible assets, and other assets.
Real Estate Loans:
ConstDev bps Bank’s construction and land development loans se-
cured by real estate held in domestic offices as a share
of bank’s total real estate loans.
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. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
Agric bps Bank’s loans secured by farmland held in domestic of-
fices as a share of bank’s total real estate loans.
1-4FamRes bps Bank’s Total loans secured by 1-4 family residential
properties held in domestic offices as a share of bank’s
total real estate loans.
5+FamRes bps Bank’s multifamily (5 or more) residential property
loans secured by real estate held in domestic offices as
a share of bank’s total real estate loans.
NonResNonFarm bps Bank’s nonresidential loans, excluding farm loans, pri-
marily secured by real estate held in domestic offices as
a share of bank’s total real estate loans.
Foreign bps Bank’s loans secured by Real Estate held in foreign of-
fices as a share of bank’s total real estate loans.
Income: Interest and Noninterest
i.RE bps Bank’s interest and fee income on loans secured by real
estate in domestic offices as a share of bank’s total in-
come.
i.CI bps Bank’s interest and fee income on commercial and in-
dustrial (C&I) loans in domestic offices as a share of
bank’s total income.
i.Cons bps Bank’s interest and fee income on consumer loans in
domestic offices as a share of bank’s total income.
These include credit card and other consumer loans
listed in Assets.
i.OthLns bps Bank’s interest and fee income on other loans as a share
of bank’s total income. Other loans include loans to for-
eign governments and official institutions, and all other
loans in domestic offices.
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. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
i.Sct bps Bank’s interest and dividend on securities as a share
of bank’s total income. This variable includes inter-
est and dividend income from U.S. Treasury securities,
U.S. government agency and corporation obligations,
securities issued by states and political subdivisions,
other domestic debt securities, foreign debt securities,
and equity securities (including investments in mutual
funds). Excludes interest income from securities held
in trading accounts.
i.FFandOth bps Bank’s other interest income as a share of bank’s total
income. Other interest income includes interest income
from lease financing receivables, on balances due from
depository institutions, from assets held in trading ac-
counts, on federal funds sold and securities purchased
under agreements to resell, and other interest income.
Nonint. bps Bank’s noninterest income as a share of bank’s to-
tal income. Noninterest income includes income from
fiduciary activities, plus service charges on deposit ac-
counts in domestic offices, plus trading gains (losses)
and fees from foreign exchange transactions, plus other
foreign transaction gains (losses), plus other gains
(losses) and fees from trading assets and liabilities.
Noninterest Income:
FiducAcvt bps Bank’s income from fiduciary activities as share of
bank’s total noninterest income.
DepAcctsChg bps Bank’s income from service charges on deposit account
as share of bank’s total noninterest income.
Trad bps Bank’s income from trading revenue as share of bank’s
total noninterest income.
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. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
Invest bps Bank’s income from other investments as share of
bank’s total noninterest income. Other investments in-
clude venture capital revenue, fees and commissions
from securities brokerage, investment banking, advi-
sory, and underwriting fees and commissions, and oth-
ers.
ServFees bps Bank’s net servicing fees as share of bank’s total nonin-
terest income. Net servicing fees include income from
servicing real estate mortgages, credit cards, and other
financial assets held by others.
Securiz bps Bank’s net securitization income as share of bank’s to-
tal noninterest income. Securization income includes
net gains (losses) on assets sold in securitization trans-
actions.
SalesAssets bps Bank’s income from sales of loans and leases, other real
estate owned, and other assets as share of bank’s total
noninterest income.
OthNonii bps Bank’s other noninterest income as share of bank’s total
noninterest income.
Expenses: Interest and Noninterest:
i.ExpDep bps Bank’s total interest expense on deposits as a share of
bank’s total expenses.
i.ExpOth bps Bank’s total interest expense excluding interest expense
on deposits as a share of bank’s total expenses.
non-i.Sal bps Bank’s salaries and employee benefits as a share of
bank’s total expenses.
non-i.As bps Bank’s expenses of premises and fixed assets (net of
rental income) as a share of bank’s total expenses.
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. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
non-i.Oth bps Bank’s other noninterest expenses as a share of bank’s
total expenses. Other noninterest expenses include
goodwill impairment losses, amortization expense and
impairment losses for other intangible assets, and other
noninterest espenses.
Interest Expenses:
TrAccts bps Bank’s expenses on transaction accounts as a share of
bank’s total interest expenses. Transaction accounts
include interest-bearing demand deposits, NOW ac-
counts, ATS accounts, and telephone and preauthorized
transfer accounts.
SavAcct bps Bank’s expenses on savings accounts as a share of
bank’s total interest expenses.
TmDep bps Bank’s interest expenses on time deposits as a share of
bank’s total interest expenses.
efrepp bps Bank’s interest expenses on federal funds purchased
and securities sold under agreements to repurchase as
a share of bank’s total interest expenses.
USTrea bps Bank’s interest expenses on demand notes issued to the
US Treasury, other borrowed money and interest on
mortgage indebtedness and obligations under capital-
ized leases on a consolidated basis as a share of bank’s
total interest expenses.
i.ExpOth bps Bank’s other interest expenses as a share of bank’s to-
tal interest expenses. Other interest expenses include
interest on deposits in foreign offices, trading liabili-




. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
ROA bps Bank’s net income after taxes and extraordinary items
(annualized) as a percent of average total asset.
EfficR bps Bank’s noninterest expense less amortization of intan-
gible assets as a percent of net interest income plus non-
interest income. This ratio measures the proportion of
net operating revenues that are absorbed by overhead
expenses, so that a lower value indicates greater effi-
ciency.
NetIntMg bps Bank’s total interest income less total interest expense
(annualized) as a percent of average earning assets.
Tier1Cap bps Bank’s tier 1 (core) capital as a percent of average total
assets minus ineligible intangibles. Tier 1 (core) capital
includes common equity plus noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock plus minority interests in consolidated
subsidiaries less goodwill and other ineligible intangi-
ble assets.
nLnsAsR bps Bank’s loan and lease financing receivables, net of un-
earned income, allowances, and reserves, as a percent
of total assets.
nLnsDepR bps Bank’s loans and lease financing receivables net of un-
earned income, allowances and reserves as a percent of
total deposits.
EqAsR bps Bank’s total equity capital as a percent of total assets.
DebtEqR bps Bank’s total liability as a percent of total equity capital.
Z Variables:
inc log units Log of state real income per capita.
pop5yrg bps State 5-year population growth rate.
busi5yrg bps State 5-year business growth rate.
age65over bps State share of population over 65 years old.
DebtInc.pc dollars State household debt to income per capita ratio.
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. . . continued
Variable Name Unit Description
RPP index State regional price parity (proxy for state inflation).
SBPI index Small Business Policy Index which measures how well
a state, through public policies, creates a nurturing en-
vironment for entrepreneurial activity and the develop-
ment of small businesses.
GeoExpansion.st bps Average geographical expansion of banks in a state.
SB.st bps Share of savings banks in a state.
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